The Reaction to Economic Globalization in Latin America: A Case Study of Argentina by Warner, Lisa A.
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
7-11-2006
The Reaction to Economic Globalization in Latin
America: A Case Study of Argentina
Lisa A. Warner
University of South Florida
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the American Studies Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Warner, Lisa A., "The Reaction to Economic Globalization in Latin America: A Case Study of Argentina" (2006). Graduate Theses and
Dissertations.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/3831
The Reaction to Economic Globalization in Latin America: 
A Case Study of Argentina 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Lisa A. Warner 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts  
Department of Political Science 
College of Arts and Sciences 
University of South Florida 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Professor: Harry E. Vanden, Ph.D. 
Steven C. Tauber, Ph.D. 
Jorge Nef, Ph.D 
      
 
 
Date of Approval: 
July 11, 2006 
 
 
 
Keywords: economic liberalism, neoliberalism, development, economic crisis, néstor 
kirchner 
 
© Copyright 2006 , Lisa A. Warner 
 
 
 i
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract                    ii 
 
Chapter One  
Introduction                  1 
 
Chapter Two  
Literature Review and Methodology               7 
  Advocates of Globalization               7 
  Opponents of Globalization             15 
  Alternative Theories of Development           18 
Methodology                21 
 
Chapter Three  
Economic Liberalism               24  
 Intergovernmental Organizations            26 
  Transnational Corporations             29 
  Conclusion on Economic Liberalism            30 
 
Chapter Four  
Economic Liberalism within Latin America                      32 
 
Chapter Five  
Argentina                36 
  Historical Background             36 
  Argentina under President Menem            40 
  The Economic Crisis of December 2001/January 2002 and Aftermath    43  
Chapter Six  
The Kirchner Years               48 
  Background to Néstor Kirchner            48 
 President Kirchner’s Policies             51 
  Results of Kirchner’s Policies            59 
 
Chapter Seven  
Conclusion                64  
 
References                  76 
   
 ii
 
 
 
 
The Reaction to Economic Globalization in Latin America: 
A Case Study of Argentina 
 
Lisa A. Warner 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Since Washington Consensus policies became predominant in the 1980s, two 
sides of the economic globalization debate have developed: advocates claim that trade 
liberalization, deregulation, privatization and reduced state spending increase growth and 
therefore reduce poverty, while critics claim that levels of poverty and income disparity 
have worsened at the same time that social welfare and education programs have suffered 
budget cuts.  Over the past decade, as many Latin Americans have failed to see promised 
results to alleviate poverty stemming from the “lost decade” of the 1980s (and beyond), 
they have elected “leftist” presidents that campaigned on anti-economic globalization (or 
anti-neoliberal) platforms in Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay and most 
recently, Bolivia. 
 In order to examine whether policies pursued by these leftward-leaning presidents 
present a potential development alternative to the policies of economic globalization, my 
methodology is a case study of Argentina. The study is longitudinal; it first examines the 
Washington Consensus policies as Argentine President Carlos Menem applied them in 
the 1990s.  It then investigates the policies of the current president, Néstor Kirchner, in an 
effort to determine if his policies constitute an alternative model of development for 
Argentina after the economic crash of December 2001/January 2002.  The study finds 
 iii
that, while President Kirchner has taken a firm stance with the IMF and creditors, his 
polices do not represent a clear break with economic globalization.  Kirchner has 
instituted new policies to ameliorate poverty and the effects of globalization, but he has 
renegotiated and paid external debt (rather than directing that money to domestic 
programs) and continues to work with companies privatized by Menem.  President 
Kirchner more aptly presents a model that walks a fine line between economic 
globalization and national development.      
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Globalization:  the word evokes diverse ideas and reactions.  According to various 
arguments, globalization has created a stronger sense of connectedness among the 
world’s nations and cultures and improved living standards in some poor, developing 
countries as workers have access to new jobs provided by multinational corporations. 
Other accounts claim globalization has advanced environmental degradation as these 
same transnational corporations (TNCs) move from one country to another in search of 
lax regulations, leaving poor countries to suffer the consequences, or that globalization 
has diminished sovereignty in many nations as TNCs and intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) dictate requirements for attracting capital or obtaining international 
loans.  Advocates and opponents of globalization can argue each of the preceding 
statements and none would be completely wrong, as the benefits and repercussions 
stemming from globalization continue to cause widespread debate. 
Jan Aart Scholte (2000) offers five broad definitions of globalization: 
internationalization, liberalization, universalization, modernization/westernization and 
deterritorialization (15-16).  Internationalization refers to increased international 
exchange and interdependence, while liberalization includes removing government 
restrictions on movement between countries in order to create an open world economy.  
Universalization concerns diffusing objects and experiences to people in all parts of the 
world.  Within modernization/westernization, the structures of modernity (capitalism, 
bureaucracy, etc.) are spread worldwide, whereas deterritorialization encompasses the 
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idea that social space is no longer confined to territorial space, and includes the use of 
telecommunications to compress time and space.  Clearly the five definitions are 
interconnected and interrelated.  People worldwide have reacted both positively and 
negatively to the effects of globalization as it is embodied in these definitions, be it 
westernization, liberalization or deterritorialization.  However, the consequences of 
liberalization, or economic globalization, have been some of the most profound.   
Many governments, intellectuals and IGOs laud the advantages of trade and 
economic liberalization, while other academics, nongovernmental organizations and 
workers decry what they see as a steep decline in living standards and sovereignty.  
Globalization advocate Jagdish Bhagwati (2004) defines economic globalization as 
various forms of international integration, including foreign trade, multinational direct 
foreign investment, cross-border migration and technological dissemination (ix).  These 
ideas are embodied in the policies of various world governments as well as international 
financial institutions (such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Trade agreements like the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada and Mexico, in addition 
to the increased number and size of multinational corporations, also exemplify economic 
globalization.  Based on economic growth and freer trade through globalization, Kemal 
Dervis (2005) stresses that since the 1980s, more people throughout the world have been 
able to escape poverty than at any other time in history (xx).   However, other authors 
(Nef & Robles 2000; Peet 2003) argue that living standards have deteriorated, poverty 
rates have increased and sovereignty has been undermined by policies propagated by 
international financial institutions.    
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It is crucial to examine the effects of economic globalization and the claim that it 
exacerbates poverty.  Continued widespread poverty plays a profound role in 
transnational problems such as the drug trade, the spread of infectious disease, illegal 
immigration, international human trafficking, terrorism and a growing number of 
refugees fleeing failed states.  The spread of technology to less developed countries has 
made these threats even more intense as the division between the “haves” and the “have-
nots” becomes starkly more evident when displayed on television or accessed over the 
Internet.  Without sufficient development of social welfare programs, government 
regulation and policy coordination, changes wrought by globalization have the potential 
to cause greater crisis and increase transnational problems, subsequently diminishing 
stability and growth in all nations.   
In concert with the assertion of higher rates of poverty resulting from economic 
globalization are claims of environmental degradation, diminished worker rights and loss 
of sovereignty.  As a result, a backlash against globalization has developed, with 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), workers, students, environmentalists and human 
rights organizations, among others, demanding a more “humane” globalization.  While 
this backlash is evident in the protests at WTO trade rounds, G-7 meetings, etc., it has 
also seen extensive development within Latin America in the form of greater numbers of 
states electing leftward-leaning presidents.  Over the past decade, Venezuela, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay and most recently, Bolivia, have elected presidents who 
campaign against policies of economic globalization. How are these new presidents 
directing their countries?  Do they provide a substantial change from policies of 
economic globalization?  The research question proposed herein is to determine if the 
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policies pursued by leftward-leaning presidents in Latin America suggest a potential 
development alternative to the policies of economic globalization, as seen through a case 
study of Argentina.  The hypothesis is that the new president of Argentina, Néstor 
Kirchner, while not completely rejecting trade liberalization or globalization, is pursuing 
policies of stronger state intervention and government control in order to direct the 
economy to provide greater stability within Argentina following the economic collapse of 
December 2001/January 2002.  Stability in this context signifies sustained economic 
growth, declining or low poverty rates (below 20%; poverty in Argentina in 1992 stood at 
15%), low or stable rates of unemployment (historically at less than 10% in Argentina, 
until the 1990s), and a low rate of inflation (10% per year, which is the rate that Kirchner 
has proposed to Congress). 
There is much debate concerning the shift to the left in Latin America.  Some 
scholars argue that there are currently two “lefts” within Latin America (Valenzuela 
2005): the anti-American populists (such as Hugo Chávez of Venezuela) and the social-
democratic left that has not completely broken with policies of economic liberalism (such 
as Luiz Inácio Lula de Silva of Brazil).  In order to operationalize the left, or leftward-
leaning presidents, within this paper, it will include presidents who advocate 
redistribution of income to support social welfare programs, such as health care, 
education and housing for the poor, a social safety net for the 
unemployed/underemployed, and pension for the elderly.  Additionally, leftist policies 
incorporate strong state government, support of some nationalized industries and 
regulations to protect workers (and possibly the natural environment).  Support of local 
industry is also important.  This definition is termed “leftward-leaning” or leftist to 
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distinguish it from the classic socialist or communist left that promotes abolition of 
private property, equal distribution of income, a classless society, and revolution. 
Within the debate regarding current movements in Latin America, populism is yet 
another important component.  Populism gained prominence in Latin America after 
World War I and remained prevalent until the early 1960s (especially as governments fell 
prey to military coups d’état).  While it is often described specifically as irresponsible use 
of public money to win mass support, populism has several defining characteristics: (1) a 
charismatic leader who uses mass communication to create a personal bond with the 
public, at times to the point of demagoguery; (2) popular sovereignty that cuts across 
classes for support; (3) a sense of nationalism or cultural pride; (4) a program that rarely 
fits one existing doctrine but is flexible and draws from several sociopolitical models 
such as socialism, democratic capitalism or corporatism; and (5) a promise of a higher 
standard of living for the masses, especially through patronage (a policy which often 
leads to high inflation and indebtedness, as well as corruption or misconduct by officials) 
(Conniff 1999).  The current leftist governments of Latin America clearly utilize some 
aspects and policies of populism; however, to varying degrees, they also campaigned 
against privatization and support nationalization of some industries, as well as a stronger 
central government that can direct and mitigate the effects of economic development and 
globalization.  Moreover, while support of wealth redistribution is prevalent on the 
continent with the greatest rates of income disparity worldwide (Sherman 2000), most of 
the new leftists are trying to strike a balance between social development spending and 
some tenets of economic globalization (such as trade liberalization, reduction of tariffs, 
etc.).  It would thus be wrong to categorize the current changes on the continent solely as 
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the resurgence of populism.  Moreover, as stated above, policies and practices vary 
throughout the region, making it difficult to generalize from one country to another. 
The term “economic globalization” is variously called economic liberalism, 
market fundamentalism, trade liberalism, and neoliberalism.  While the latter may have a 
negative connotation within Western nations, it remains the preferred title within Latin 
America and is thus used in this paper.  While these terms build on some of the same 
ideas as classic liberalism (discussed in chapter three), they refer to the economic 
development theory that gained prominence in the 1980s under U.S. President Ronald 
Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (and remains current today).   
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Chapter Two: Literature Review and Methodology 
Advocates of Globalization  
In Globalization and Its Discontents (2003), Joseph E. Stiglitz delivers a strong 
criticism of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its current role in globalization.  
Stiglitz, a former member of the Council of Economic Advisors under President Bill 
Clinton and former chief economist at the World Bank, believes globalization can be a 
positive force with the potential to enrich everyone, including the poor.  However, the 
Washington Consensus policies (or “market fundamentalism”, as Stiglitz terms it) 
currently advocated by the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank have damaged developing 
economies and subsequently increased poverty and income disparity.  While Stiglitz 
briefly discusses policies of the World Bank and the WTO, he focuses primarily on the 
IMF, with the perspective he gleaned through three years at its sister organization, the 
World Bank.  One of his principal criticisms is that the organization lacks transparency 
(although it is a public institution, it is not accountable to the public).  Neither debate nor 
alternative policies are presented to a country that requests IMF funds; every country 
receives the same prescription for lowering inflation and promoting growth.  However, 
when the policies falter (as they most frequently do, according to the author), the citizens 
who had no voice in debating or selecting the failed policies must ultimately pay for them 
through higher taxes, decreased subsidies, and a lower standard of living.    
While a strong proponent of trade liberalization, Stiglitz’s writing also presents a 
potential alternative model for development.  He proposes that rather than presenting an 
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economically troubled country with a standard recipe for growth (lower trade barriers, 
higher interest rates and reduced subsidies), the IMF must allow countries the time to 
implement reforms in a strategic, controlled manner.  Additionally, he stresses not only 
the importance of having government regulations in place well before enacting policy 
changes, but also the necessity of a stronger role for state governments as they implement 
change.  As historical examples, he discusses both the U.S. and Europe in their initial 
years of growth and development: both utilized a gradual, state-controlled approach to 
growth to mitigate economic downturns.  As contemporary examples of the importance 
of sequencing regulations and changes as well as pacing reform, he presents two 
contrasting examples: East Asia and Russia.  East Asia, until the crisis of 1997, 
experienced unprecedented levels of growth, which the author partly attributes to reforms 
implemented at a government-controlled pace.  Even after the crisis of 1997 (for which 
the author feels the IMF was partially to blame), those countries that followed IMF 
prescriptions (Thailand and Indonesia) were mired in crisis far longer than those that did 
not (South Korea and Malaysia).  In contrast, when Russia and the former Socialist 
countries in Eastern Europe turned from communism to a market economy, the IMF 
advised rapid privatization (a tenet of market fundamentalism), leading to the sale of state 
assets at minimal prices before the necessary regulatory and legal infrastructure was in 
place.  Without restrictions on their action, the new owners and managers stripped the 
privatized companies of their assets and invested the money overseas, leaving Russia 
with a dearth of capital for investment, greater income disparity and a distrust of 
capitalism among its many impoverished citizens.  Based on these examples and others, 
the author therefore advocates a stronger role for government than that proposed by the 
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IMF, while at the same time supporting market forces and trade liberalization.  While the 
market fundamentalism ideology of the intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) posits 
that government is part of the problem in increasing growth, Stiglitz maintains that it is 
part of the solution.  Governments can and should mitigate the potential downturns 
inherent in the change to a market economy, especially in less developed countries, in 
order to provide sequencing and pacing of reforms as well as regulatory infrastructure, 
job development, and a safety net for those who fall below the poverty line.  He thus 
recommends that the IGOs change their governance to allow for transparency and debate 
on alternatives.  For Stiglitz, these reforms will lead to positive changes and success 
within globalization. 
Jagdish Bhagwati’s In Defense of Globalization (2004) attempts to address many 
of the arguments advanced by opponents of economic globalization: threats to 
sovereignty, diminishing labor standards (or upholding the lack of labor standards in 
developing countries), and increased poverty and income disparity within developing 
nations.  Bhagwati asserts that globalization, with its inherent component of increased 
trade liberalization, increases growth and therefore decreases poverty; however, he 
affirms that appropriate policies must be instated in order to allow the benefits of trade 
liberalization to aid the poor.  For example, microfinancing and access to credit for the 
impoverished, as well as job retraining for those displaced by foreign competition, need 
to be part of a successful globalization effort.  With respect to labor standards, the author 
feels that problems with enforcement of better labor regulations lie within the host 
country, rather than in policies propagated by multinational corporations; for these 
multinationals to compel changes in labor standards would infringe on the sovereignty of 
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the host country.  The author stresses that as multinationals increase the demand for labor 
in a host country, wages and government tax income rise, thus decreasing overall 
poverty.  Finally, domestic firms learn productivity-enhancing techniques from 
multinationals, as well as increasing their level of technological expertise.    
Bhagwati also addresses criticism directed at policies of the World Bank, IMF 
and WTO.  He feels that there is ample room for compromise within the conditionality 
policies of the World Bank and IMF regarding trade liberalization (for example, countries 
can propose a tax increase or privatize a public-sector industry in place of rapid trade 
liberalization), and he affirms that developing countries would greatly benefit from such 
liberalization.  With respect to the conclusion that both international financial institutions 
offer a standard recipe for growth and reform within liberalization, the author states that 
only two options actually exist: a country can move toward trade liberalization or against 
it (i.e., toward greater protectionism); therefore, the standardized liberalization policies 
are warranted.  Finally, while Bhagwati finds no inherent problem with rapid trade 
liberalization, he strongly advocates well paced rather than rapid changes toward capital 
account liberalization with government regulations in place prior to policy change (a 
view similarly expressed by Joseph Stiglitz in Globalization and Its Discontents).  The 
author concludes with several recommendations that he believes will augment 
globalization’s force for economic growth and positive social transition: stronger civil 
society in the form of NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) to assist low-income or 
underrepresented groups; institutions and policies that mitigate downturns when they 
occur (such as unemployment insurance); and strengthened review and monitoring 
functions of the appropriate international agencies. 
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Kemal Dervis investigates legitimacy within global governance institutions in A 
Better Globalization: Legitimacy, Governance and Reform (2005).  Dervis, who worked 
for the World Bank for 22 years, shares his optimism that greater globalization and trade 
liberalization can increase growth and help eliminate poverty, disease and suffering 
worldwide; however, he asserts that “better” globalization needs deliberate intervention 
coupled with a new institutional setting to govern its processes.  Dervis defines 
legitimacy as acting with the consent of those who are governed, which for the author 
includes the global governance institutions introduced at the end of World War II (the 
United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions and the General Agreement on Tariff and 
Trade, later to become the World Trade Organization).  However, these institutions still 
reflect the beliefs and divisions of the Cold War rather than the economic and political 
realities of the 21st century, in which the competition between communism and 
democracy no longer plays a prominent role and countries have become further integrated 
through trade, communication and travel.  He emphasizes the nearly universal acceptance 
of the idea of  “social-liberal synthesis,” in which private property and competitive 
markets drive growth, but economic downturns are mitigated by a redistributive and 
regulatory role played by governments within a democratic setting.  Due to the 
sovereignty of nations, this role does not exist at the international level; therefore, 
resolutions made within the global governance and international financial institutions 
lack legitimacy for the populations for whom decisions are made.  While stressing that he 
does not advocate a “world government,” Dervis presents a reformed system of global 
governance that could provide greater transparency and legitimacy, and thus ownership 
of reforms within affected countries (for example, economic reforms that would allow for 
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greater trade liberalization while at the same time providing a social safety net, under the 
auspices of the IMF).   
Dervis proposes reforms within two spheres: political (the UN) and economic (the 
World Bank, IMF and WTO).  In the political arena, he recommends enlarging the UN 
Security Council to include greater world representation, as well as changing the voting 
structure to one of weighted votes (with weights based on relative populations, GDP, 
financial contribution to funding global goods, and military capability).  The author 
further advocates the creation of a UN Economic and Social Security Council (UNESC), 
on par with the UN Security Council, that would be a governance umbrella for all 
economic and social agencies within the UN, including, for example, the UN 
Development Program and the International Labor Office, as well as drawing in the 
World Bank, IMF and WTO.  While the UNESC would not manage these three financial 
institutions, it would appoint their presidents (rather than the current exclusive practice of 
U.S. and European leadership) and evaluate the efficacy of their programs.  With respect 
to the WTO, the author also suggests that the UNESC (coupled with nongovernmental 
organizations) address issues such as labor or health, thus leaving the WTO free to 
negotiate trade issues in an expedited manner.  The author feels that a reformed UN and 
the creation of the UNESC would substantially increase the legitimacy of the 
organizations, and thus create domestic support and in-country ownership for needed 
reforms and programs.  This support would subsequently allow for further trade 
liberalization, growth and development. 
In two articles (“What Washington Means by Policy Reform,” published in 1990, 
and “What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington Consensus?”, published 
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as a follow-up in 2000), John Williamson summarizes the policies that have come to be 
known as the “Washington Consensus,” which in Latin America have become 
synonymous with the policies of economic globalization. Williamson coined this phrase 
in his discussion of the ten policies thought to comprise a desirable set of economic 
reforms agreed to in Washington with respect to Latin America after a decade of financial 
crisis in the 1980s (the “lost decade”).   In his discussion, “Washington” is composed of 
the economic agencies, senior administration and members of Congress of the US 
government, the “technocratic Washington” of the international financial institutions, and 
the U.S. Federal Reserve (1).  The original policies for which Williamson finds a 
consensus in Washington are: (1) fiscal discipline (especially in order to reduce the 
extraordinarily high rates of inflation in many countries of the region and avoid further 
capital flight); (2) redirection of public expenditure toward primary education, primary 
health care and infrastructure; (3) tax reform (to create a broader tax base); (4) interest 
rate liberalization; (5) a competitive exchange rate; (6) trade liberalization; (7) 
liberalization of foreign direct investment to bring capital, technology and skills to the 
region; (8) privatization; (9) deregulation; and (10) secure property rights.  (Williamson 
later recanted on the fifth policy, a competitive exchange rate, stating that no consensus 
existed on this policy) (2000).   
In 2000, Williamson revisited his examination of the Washington Consensus and 
found that the policies he presented as the “lowest common denominator” (or the ones for 
which a consensus existed) for growth and development in Latin America had come to 
signify neoliberal or economic liberalism policies, often blamed for increasing poverty 
and income disparity within the region.  Williamson also admits that little progress has 
 14
been made in redirecting public expenditure toward priorities such as primary education, 
health and infrastructure, as these are areas that often suffer budget reductions in the 
pursuit of fiscal responsibility.  While Williamson emphasizes that the Washington 
Consensus advice remains valid for the region and promotes development and growth, he 
feels that further emphasis on anti-poverty and development policies is necessary.  
Editors Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski and John Williamson present a series of articles 
on policy reform in Latin America in After the Washington Consensus: Restarting 
Growth and Reform in Latin America (2003).  One of the central ideas of the book is that 
globalization and liberalization have not been responsible for the renewed economic 
problems and increased poverty of the 1990s because growth stemming from these 
policies has the power to decrease poverty.  However, as the authors examine the 
implementation of the Washington Consensus policies, they emphasize that poor growth 
rates coupled with a failure to diminish poverty and income distribution disparity have 
allowed for a vicious cycle in which the low growth rates exacerbate poverty while at the 
same time, poverty intensifies low growth rates.  The Washington Consensus policies, 
although they have diminished the high inflation prevalent in the region, have failed to 
address the underlying structural problems that inhibit growth for the poor, such as basic 
infrastructure, primary education, primary health care, lack of access to credit, and lack 
of property rights.  Additionally, while trade liberalization promised to open new markets 
for unskilled labor (and subsequently decrease unemployment rates), the authors stress 
that this has not been the case due to labor market regulations, loss of jobs to competition 
from imports (from China, for example, where labor is less costly), and the lack of 
tertiary education that would enable employment within the higher-demand skilled labor 
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markets of finance, insurance and banking.  The authors admit that unemployment rates 
in the 1990s were higher than those in the “lost decade” of the 1980s and stress that a 
large number of Latin Americans remains in the informal sector of the economy, without 
access to health care, pensions, long-term contracts or a minimum wage.  In order to 
overcome some of the problems that continue to hold the region back from growth and 
greater income equity, the authors recommend fiscal and monetary policy to reduce 
instability (boom and bust cycles and capital flight, for example); greater investment in 
the social agenda (education, health care and a social safety net) and infrastructure; and 
greater flexibility within labor market regulations.   
Opponents of Globalization 
Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO (2003) examines the history and 
development of these three global governance organizations from their post World War II 
creation to their current position as bastions of economic liberalism (or “neoliberal 
economic policy,” as it is termed by the author).  Author Richard Peet argues that, while 
globalization is not inherently negative for society, the undemocratic processes and 
neoliberal policies espoused by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the 
World Trade Organization might destroy the potential of a globalized world.  In his 
examination of the IMF and the World Bank, Peet discusses Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs), originally devised to tackle the structural economic problems that 
cause high inflation and low growth rates in many countries, but which have become a 
recipe for greater wealth disparity.  Coupled with enormous debt from IMF and World 
Bank loans, people in developing countries suffer from greater poverty as their 
governments attempt to comply with policies stipulated in SAPs.  The WTO, according 
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to the author, presents itself as a neutral meeting place where governments can amicably 
resolve disputes regarding trade policy; however, this organization also presents 
economic liberalization as the surest route to growth and prosperity, a prescription 
disputed by Peet due to the lack of transparency practiced by the organization as well as 
policy prescriptions that have increased wealth disparity in developing nations.  The 
author ends his analysis with an argument against the hegemony of the IMF, World Bank 
and WTO based on policies of the Washington Consensus and combined with the 
banking industry, and demands reform toward more open, democratic processes within 
these global governance institutions.     
System in Crisis: The Dynamics of Free Market Capitalism (2003) by James 
Petras and Henry Veltmeyer offers an anti-imperial, revolutionary perspective of the 
current state of the capitalist system, as well as a sampling of the forces that fight against 
it (primarily in Latin America).  The authors assert that the capitalist system has been 
pushed beyond its functional limits economically, ecologically, financially and 
politically, especially given the unsustainable levels of external debt and disparities in 
social conditions in many developing nations.  They further claim that these enduring 
problems are a result of neoliberal policies propagated by Western countries and 
international financial institutes (IFIs) such as the IMF and the World Bank.  One of the 
authors’ central ideas is that the United States has been forced into in a new, post-9/11 
phase of imperial pursuit via the military due to diminishing effectiveness of IFIs and 
neoliberal policy.  The Right, led by the U.S., has consolidated its power through 
neoliberal policy and military force while the Left has taken to the streets in the form of 
protests, social movements, indigenous movements, etc.  The authors present two 
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movements, in Argentina and Ecuador, to exemplify the reaction to neoliberal policy that 
has failed to improve living standards in the developing world.  Coupled with movements 
against the U.S. military (the FARC and Hamas are two examples given by the authors), 
these social movements have the power to resist further incursion by the U.S. and the 
West.  In closing, the authors argue that the neoliberal model of development and 
globalization is actually a “dummy target” for the anti-globalization movement (AGM), 
as most governments and theorists acknowledge that the current system is unsustainable 
and in need of reform (224); they add that the persistent North-South gap will generate 
further social unrest that will cause political and economic upheaval within the entire 
capitalist system.  
In Global Backlash: Citizen Initiatives for a Just World Economy (2002), editor 
Robin Broad explores the historical foundations of globalization, arguments for and 
against continued economic integration, and the current worldwide “backlash” against the 
phenomenon.  She explains that participants in the citizens’ backlash include farmers, 
indigenous groups, women’s organizations, workers, students, environmentalists, 
consumer advocates and human rights activists that are not strictly the radicals portrayed 
by the mainstream media.  Although each group has different objectives, they have 
unified in their opposition to corporate control of the global economy.  Broad presents the 
disparate groups’ attempts to alter the effects of globalization (the vast majority does not 
expect nor necessarily want to end it): some groups have had success promoting “social 
clauses” that attach workers’ rights or environmental protection to trade and investment 
agreements and are regulated by governments.  These clauses allow for trade sanctions in 
the case of noncompliance.  Other groups have requested self-regulation and codes of 
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conduct to regulate corporations, which have been most successful in reducing child 
labor or other highly publicized cases like sweatshops.  Yet others promote alternative 
and fair trade programs that have helped small businesses, farmers and artisans overcome 
the effects of economic globalization.  Broad closes with the acknowledgement that it 
remains difficult to measure the effectiveness of the backlash movement.  Some groups 
have been effective in changing aspects of various industries, but the scope has thus far 
been limited.  She does emphasize, however, that the citizens’ backlash is more 
sophisticated, powerful and organized than portrayed in the media and will remain more 
than solely a protest movement.   
Alternative Theories of Development 
Charles Gore examines a potential paradigm shift in development theory in “The 
Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries,” 
published in World Development (2000).  Gore explores the prevalence of neoliberal 
economic policy (or the Washington Consensus) stemming from the 1980s (and 
manifested in the shift from state-led to market-led policies), as well as the fact that 
development policy analysis has concomitantly shifted from a national frame of reference 
for explanation and evaluation to a global one.  This global perspective has avowed that 
conforming to the tenets of a liberal international economic order (LIEO) will lead not 
only to greater economic outcomes for individual nations but also for the global 
community; however, this has not been the case for many developing nations.  Thus, the 
author argues that a “latent Southern Consensus” provides a potential paradigmatic shift 
in development theory, one that merges East Asian developmentalism with Latin 
American neostructuralism.  The so-called Southern Consensus focuses on economic 
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growth but allows for various policy stipulations: (1) Greater state control in opening up 
to international markets is important, especially with regard to timing, speed and 
sequence.  Use of tariffs enables national enterprises to build production capabilities, 
while capital account liberalization should be gradual.  (2) Macroeconomic policy is 
growth-oriented (described as “productive development policy”) that reduces inflation 
and deficits but also ensures full production capacity.  Aspects of this policy include 
human resource development, technology policy, infrastructure development and 
industrial organization.  (3) The State is responsible for development in partnership with 
the business community, through private initiative whenever possible.  However, State 
capacity is enhanced, especially when focusing on overcoming specific problems such as 
missing markets or technology.  (4) Wide asset ownership and productive employment 
assist a production-oriented approach to growth, rather than redistributive transfers.  (5) 
Regional integration and cooperation are important for integration into the global 
economy, particularly in order to develop regional production chains and markets.  These 
five elements aim to enhance national capabilities and long-term growth.  Additionally, 
the author stresses the importance of structural change stemming from partnership, 
participation and consensus rather than being externally imposed.  
In “Globalism as Development Strategy: In Search of Alternatives,” W.D. 
Lakshman (2004) argues that there are actually two modes in which to search for 
alternative models of development to economic globalization: one is the search for 
alternatives to globalization (as preferred by socialist thinkers and activists), while the 
other is to search for alternatives within globalization.  Working within the latter 
perspective, the author presents six policies for development:  (1) Acknowledge that the 
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state has a significant role in development policy and that state-owned enterprises can 
pioneer industries in promising fields and then hand them over to private enterprise.  
Infrastructure remains the responsibility of the state, but it can benefit from private sector 
participation.  A key concept is that the State has a wider role than that advocated by 
neoliberalism, but doesn’t encroach on private enterprise. (2) Greater emphasis lies on a 
more balanced approach to internal and external economic processes in that infant 
industries are protected by tariffs, and timing of opening to imports and global influence 
is important.  However, openness to the rest of world is necessary and beneficial due to 
gains in technology and market access.  (3) It is important to accept the necessity of 
producing basic food items and manufacturing (rather than strict focus on exports) to 
alleviate poverty and provide jobs.  (4) Rather than focusing strictly on profits, it is 
necessary to recognize the benefits of wages that enable workers to achieve and maintain 
a comfortable standard of living, which subsequently increases aggregate demand, 
reduces societal inequality, and improves work incentives.  (5) SAPs from “above” (the 
IMF, World Bank, etc.) need to be replaced by adjustment programs from “below” (with 
participation of the populace) because they can facilitate investment in education, 
research, health and productivity for sustained development purposes.  (6) Tailor 
development policy to the conditions and culture of each particular nation, rather than 
providing one policy approach for all developing nations. 
Based on the above literature, it is clear that there are many disparate beliefs and 
theories concerning economic globalization and its instruments, as well as the positive 
and negative effects of globalization policy.  In addition, as problems have arisen, authors 
have examined and theorized possible alternatives to this prevalent theory of economic 
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development.  What is the most useful strategy for assessing the ideas discussed above?  
As stated in the introduction, the paper presents a case study of Argentina; it is thus 
important to delineate the methodology with which to do so. 
Methodology 
In order to examine whether policies pursued by leftward-leaning presidents in 
Latin America present a potential development alternative to the policies of economic 
globalization, my method will be a case study of Argentina.  Although several Latin 
American countries have elected leftist presidents who campaign against policies of 
economic globalization, it is difficult to generalize the policies that each of them has 
pursued and implemented.  Each administration has its own priorities, problems and 
methods, from the populist approach utilized by Hugo Chávez in oil-rich Venezuela to an 
approach more in concert with neoliberal policies, such as that of Luiz Inácio Lula de 
Silva of Brazil.  Therefore, rather than presenting a summary of the disparate policies of 
the continent, I believe it will be more advantageous to examine the results of one 
country’s approach to the problems faced by several Latin American countries in order to 
discern whether the policies are truly different from those of economic liberalism.   
Argentina provides an excellent example.     
In order to present a case study of Argentina, I will employ a longitudinal 
approach.  Carlos Menem, who was the president of Argentina from 1989-1999, 
implemented many neoliberal policies during his two terms in office.  In December 
2001/January 2002, the Argentine economy collapsed and Argentina saw five presidents 
in less than one month.  The current president, Néstor Kirchner, was elected in 2003.  
Therefore, I will examine the policies implemented under Menem before the crisis and 
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compare them to those that Kirchner has initiated.  One source of comparison will be the 
actual policies that both administrations implemented and the subsequent results. Another 
source of comparison will be aggregate statistics of such indicators as growth, poverty 
rates, unemployment and inflation from sources such as the World Bank and the 
Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (The Statistical 
Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean), as well as the CIA World Factbook, the 
Latin American Weekly Review, and the Instituto Naciónal de Estadística y Censos 
(INDEC) of Argentina (National Statistics and Census Institute).   (It is important to note 
that the selected primary sources are considered reliable; however, the potential for these 
sources to misrepresent data based on missing information or human error does exist).  I 
will compare the statistics from the ten-year period of Menem’s presidency (1989-1999) 
to statistics on the same indicators during and after the economic crash, and then during 
Kirchner’s presidency (2003-2005, or the most recent data).   
 An additional advantage stemming from a case study approach is the ability to 
examine in depth the causes of the rejection, at least partially, of economic globalization 
in a less developed country.  With the promise of increased growth and decreased poverty 
offered by economic liberalism that should appeal specifically to countries with low 
growth rates or high rates of poverty, what has happened to create an atmosphere of 
rejection and protest against economic globalization?  While an examination of one Latin 
American country does not provide a description of the situation in every Latin American 
country that rejects neoliberalism, it can furnish a background to the phenomenon of 
leftist presidents winning elections on campaigns that reject tenets of economic 
globalization.  Moreover, a case study approach that requires broad investigation of a 
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country allows the writer to better understand potential problems and manage 
contingencies that may arise.  
 Argentina provides an exceptional model for a case study approach within Latin 
America.  In the 1990s under President Carlos Menem, Argentina adopted many of the 
reforms proposed under the Washington Consensus and subsequently witnessed the end 
of decades of hyperinflation, increased government revenue from privatization, and 
growth from trade liberalization.  However, the economy crashed at the end of the decade 
as Argentina defaulted on its debt and poverty rates increased greatly.  Because Argentina 
implemented neoliberal reforms and subsequently suffered economic devastation, it 
provides an outstanding opportunity to examine the effects of those reforms and may 
serve as a representative case for the region.  Since the economic failure of 2001-2002, 
Argentina has not completely rejected policies of economic liberalism; it has, however, 
maintained greater control of policies under President Néstor Kirchner (elected in 2003), 
and has recently renegotiated its bondholder debt and paid off the IMF.    
 Another important factor in choosing Argentina for the case study is the fact that 
data concerning Argentina are abundant due to the amount of time that has passed since 
Argentina’s economy collapsed.  The intervening four years allow for examination of 
recent factors that remain relevant to Argentines, but also provide time for analysis and 
publication of high quality and scholarly works.  
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Chapter Three: Economic Liberalism 
 Economic liberalism builds on classic liberalism, which argues that state borders 
or governments should not impose false barriers to the efficient allocation of goods and 
capital in the world economy.  Current economic globalization policy capitalizes on that 
idea through the elimination of state-imposed restrictions on the movement of money, 
capital and goods between countries; hence support for the reduction of tariffs and trade 
barriers is preeminent (i.e., trade liberalization).  The policies favor an outward-oriented, 
export-based economy.  According to J. Nef and W. Robles (2000), neoliberalism as a 
concept arose in the United States and Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, but appeared in 
full force in the 1970s.  Since that time, it has become the predominant economic policy 
with respect to globalization.   
 John Williamson (1990) examines ten common policies associated with economic 
globalization, often termed the “Washington Consensus”.  Williamson coined this phrase 
in his discussion of the ten policies thought to comprise a desirable set of economic 
reforms agreed to in Washington with respect to Latin America after a decade of financial 
crisis in the 1980s (the “lost decade”).  The policies for which Williamson found a 
consensus in Washington are: (1) fiscal discipline (especially in order to reduce the 
extraordinarily high rates of inflation in many countries of the region and avoid further 
capital flight); (2) redirection of public expenditure toward primary education, primary 
health care and infrastructure; (3) tax reform (to create a broader tax base); (4) interest 
rate liberalization; (5) a competitive exchange rate; (6) trade liberalization; (7) 
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liberalization of foreign direct investment to bring capital, technology and skills to the 
region; (8) privatization; (9) deregulation; and (10) secure property rights.  (Williamson 
later recanted on the fifth policy, a competitive exchange rate, stating that no consensus 
existed on this policy) (2000).  While not Williamson’s intention, these policies have 
become synonymous with economic globalization and continue to be promoted by 
international financial institutions as the best means to sound growth (although in his 
reexamination of the policies in 2000, Williamson found the least progress in the area of 
redirecting public expenditures toward primary education, health care and infrastructure). 
 Richard Peet (2003) discusses the ascent of economic liberalism in the 1970s and 
1980s, primarily as a reaction to Keynesian economic policy.  As a result of the 
depression of the 1930s and World War II, economic policy shifted to include the right of 
the state to intervene in and to regulate the market economy in order to redistribute 
wealth and promote the well being of the majority of citizens (within Western 
democracies).  Social democratic policies included welfare programs, unemployment 
compensation and the subsidization of education and social services (6).  Keynesian 
economists also advocated state deficit spending to mitigate fluctuations in employment 
and reduce the likelihood of another devastating depression; consequently, growth and 
employment policies were to incorporate social policy.  These beliefs remained at the 
forefront of economic policy until the 1970s and the rise of economic liberalism. 
 Advanced in several intellectual centers worldwide, economic liberalism is 
associated most prominently with the Chicago School of Political Economy.  Founded on 
principles contrary to those of Keynesian economic policy (and harkening back to classic 
liberalism), economic liberalism advocates faith in the market to regulate the world 
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economy, coupled with the freedom of individuals to pursue their own financial interests 
outside the bounds of state intervention.  As stated above, trade liberalization, 
privatization of state-owned entities, and deregulation, in addition to reduced state 
provisions of welfare guarantees, are the most prominent facets of economic liberalism.  
These policies earned respect when problems such as stagflation in the 1970s could not 
be solved by Keynesian economics (Peet 2003). In the 1980s, the Republicans under 
Ronald Reagan (in the U.S.) and the Conservatives in Margaret Thatcher’s government 
(in the U.K.), supported by large corporations and banks, advocated the policies of 
economic liberalism as an unparalleled method to promote growth and development 
worldwide. 
Intergovernmental Organizations 
 Intergovernmental organizations, or global governance institutions, play a 
prominent role in economic globalization.  Agencies such as the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) advance economic liberalism in the 
form of privatization of state-owned entities and reduction of subsidies (the World Bank 
and the IMF), as well as the elimination of trade barriers (the WTO).  Originally founded 
as part of the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944, the World Bank was to spearhead the 
reconstruction and development of Europe after World War II, while the goal of the IMF 
was to promote stability for trade through exchange rate controls and balance of 
payments loans (Peet 2003).  However, in the 1960s and 1970s, both organizations began 
to play a more instrumental role in Third World countries.  The World Bank became 
involved in development projects, whereas the IMF shifted to granting loans to 
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developing nations.  Both organizations increasingly employed policies of economic 
liberalism, particularly in making financial aid and debt restructuring contingent upon 
conditionality, or Structural Adjustment Programs. 
 Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) became popular in the late 1970s as a 
means to urge reform in recipient countries (Welch 2001).  Structural adjustment was 
enacted as a condition to loans with the goal of promoting export-orientation and trade 
liberalization.  Requirements of SAPs include potentially higher growth rates through an 
“outward oriented” trade strategy and lower deficits through reduced public spending, 
along with fewer price controls, labor market regulations and investment regulations 
(Peet 2003).  Countries are able to increase foreign reserves (and thereby service their 
debts) through capitalizing on comparative advantages of low labor costs, for example, 
and maintaining high export levels.  Additionally, in order to integrate these countries 
into the world economy, SAPs advocate liberalizing trade, investment and finance, which 
includes a reduction in government spending and employment, currency devaluation, 
higher interest rates, reduction of trade barriers, and privatization of government-owned 
enterprises. 
 Much controversy surrounds the implementation of Structural Adjustment 
Programs in developing nations.  While SAPs have generally succeeded in decreasing 
government budget deficits and halting hyperinflation, the policies utilized have also 
increased poverty and unemployment rates (Welch 2001).  Moreover, policies advocated 
by SAPs can actually add to the structural causes of poverty because they advance 
reforms that deregulate labor, reduce the availability of social programs, weaken 
environmental standards and urge rapid privatization that can increase unemployment. 
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Another argument against SAPs stems from the fact that all countries, regardless of 
culture, historical background or financial requirements, are given the same economic 
dictates to solve their financial woes (Peet 2003; Welch 2001).  What works in Mexico 
should work in Ghana, should work in Pakistan, etc.  While one perspective states that 
there are only two options, toward greater liberalization or toward greater protectionism, 
(Bhagwati 2004), other globalization advocates support an approach that considers the 
historical or cultural background of each country in addition to specific financial 
requirements (Peet 2003; Stiglitz 2003; Lakshman 2004).   
Structural Adjustment Program policy requirements can also weaken the hand of  
sovereign nations by demanding policy changes as a condition for access to much-needed 
funds, often to service already existing debts.  If the struggling government wants a loan 
or debt restructured, it must comply with externally enforced austerity measures, often 
without input from its citizens.  Joseph Stiglitz (2003) feels that these policies, 
particularly those stemming from the IMF, often fail and that when they do, the citizens 
who had no voice in debating or selecting the failed policies must ultimately pay for them 
through higher taxes, decreased subsidies and a lower standard of living.  The policies 
can thus be very politically destabilizing, which can in turn affect the climate for foreign 
investment.  Additionally, Victor Ferkiss (2000) emphasizes that these IFI prescriptions 
do not support democracy in weaker nations because citizens soon come to realize that 
regardless of whom they elect, their leaders are powerless before the demands of the 
global governance institutions.  
 Another influential intergovernmental institution promoting economic 
globalization is the World Trade Organization.  Established in 1995, the WTO is a more 
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formal version of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) created in 1947.  
The purpose of the WTO is to promote trade liberalization through the belief that 
competition and free markets on the international level engender rapid economic growth 
that is beneficial for all.   Jagdish Bhagwati (2004) confirms the idea that increased 
growth decreases poverty through higher demand for labor and subsequently higher 
wages.  However, both Bhagwati and Joseph Stiglitz (2003) argue that necessary 
regulations must be implemented in order to promote the diffusion of growth and to 
protect those workers displaced by new industries or technological change.    
According to Richard Peet (2003), as of 2002, the WTO was comprised of 144 
member states that accounted for 97 percent of world trade (157).  He adds that the WTO 
promotes itself as a “forum for trade negotiations” whose declared goal is to help trade 
flow “smoothly, freely, fairly and predictably” (158), but emphasizes that the WTO holds 
no public hearings and does not open its processes to the public. Moreover, the WTO 
does not adopt a neutral stance on trade policy but prescribes trade liberalization, even in 
the face of evidence that it has not decreased poverty in less developed countries (Peet 
2003).   
Transnational Corporations 
 The power and reach of transnational corporations (TNCs) is not a new 
phenomenon in world history, although the presence and strength of such corporations 
has greatly increased in the past few decades with the prevalence of globalization.  
Companies such as General Motors, Unilever, Motorola, Panasonic and Nestle 
simultaneously maintain headquarters and factories in different countries, employing 
local workers in various stages of production.  These corporations supply foreign direct 
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investment to host countries and provide new job opportunities.  However, the 
corporations also have the ability to rapidly shift production and capital from one country 
to another, and thus subsequently benefit from lenient government regulations employed 
to maintain their operations within a host country.  Consequently, the capacity of less 
developed countries to pursue national goals such as domestic production or human 
development is often restricted by the government’s need to attract and maintain capital 
(Carty 2003). 
 Current World Bank, IMF and WTO directives toward trade liberalization greatly 
aid transnational corporations.  TNCs are able to maintain different stages of production 
in various nations (taking advantage of low wages or lack of environmental standards) 
and import or export manufactured goods in order to complete assembly of complex 
goods (such as automobiles) or sell finished products.  Additionally, IMF and World 
Bank obligations that reduce state welfare provisions for citizens serve TNCs because 
they can capitalize on poverty conditions to force long working hours or low wages.  
Sovereign nations must walk a fine line between state-directed development policies and 
those that will maintain capital and development from TNCs.  Hence, along with global 
governance institutions, transnational corporations benefit from current economic 
globalization policies, while less developed countries struggle to develop and escape 
from their burden of debt.  
Conclusion on Economic Liberalism 
 The worldwide trend toward economic globalization has tended to benefit a 
minority of actors.  Wealthy industrialized countries, transnational corporations and well-
connected elites in less developed countries have realized gains from the policy shift.  
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However, the current development model has been less advantageous to those outside 
these groups; they have often suffered deteriorating living standards, increased income 
disparity, environmental degradation and undermined sovereignty (Nef & Robles 2000).  
Victor Ferkiss (2000) emphasizes that economic globalization policies are socially 
destabilizing as well, especially when considering uprooted farmers, migration to cities 
and the loss of community as people change their lifestyle in order to seek employment.  
Structural Adjustment Programs advocated by the World Bank and the IMF are intended 
to increase growth that will benefit all citizens; however, greater underdevelopment and 
poverty, as well as weakened sovereignty, have often been the results.  John Sherman 
(2000) adds that policies of the IMF and the World Bank, including SAPs, “facilitate 
wealth extraction” from developing nations, and he states that since 1983 they have taken 
several hundred billion dollars more from less developed countries (in debt servicing 
payments) than they have contributed in loans (159).  Therefore, while some groups 
clearly benefit from economic globalization, many citizens of developing nations believe 
the policies have not fulfilled the promise of poverty reduction.  What has been the 
reaction to economic globalization in less developed countries of the world?   
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Chapter Four: Economic Liberalism within Latin America 
 High levels of debt in Latin America have been instrumental in allowing 
neoliberal policies to dictate economic (and by extension, political) control in the region.  
During the Cold War, and especially with the onset of high inflation in the U.S. in the 
1970s, cheap credit became available to Latin American countries in order to promote 
development and fend off communist influence in the region, while at the same time 
allowing U.S. banks to increase their earnings (Sherman 2000).  After 1970, Latin 
American countries began to borrow from private First World banks in addition to 
servicing loans from international financial institutions.  John Sherman (2000) states that 
the region began the decade with relatively low public and private debt, but ended it 
owing $250 billion (155).  However, when Ronald Reagan’s administration changed U.S. 
fiscal policy in 1981 in order to reign in inflation, the region saw interest rates jump at the 
same time that prices for oil and other commodities exported by the region dropped 
precipitously.  The result was the “lost decade” in Latin America, a name given to the 
1980s as a decade lost to development and mired in shrinking growth rates, per capita 
income and investment, and hyperinflation.   
 In the early 1980s, the U.S., the IMF and international banks negotiated with 
Latin American countries to arrange new conditions for repayment of the region’s debt.  
During these negotiations, the IMF moved to center stage within the debt management 
program and began to cooperate with the World Bank in the implementation of 
conditionality policies to address underlying structural deficiencies within each country 
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(Structural Adjustment Programs) (Sherman 2000).  Privatization followed, as did foreign 
influence and capital.  Many state-owned entities were sold below their value, enriching 
domestic elites and foreign corporations.  Additionally, in order to combat hyperinflation, 
high interest rates and reduced spending on public services were advocated.  
Hyperinflation ended, but many countries fell into recession (Sherman 2000).   
 During the 1990s, the international financial institutes pushed for further austerity 
measures, including cutting government expenditures and increasing revenues (i.e., the 
Washington Consensus policies).  Export-oriented policies were promoted, along with 
free trade and reduction of tariffs.  NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) 
began in 1994 between the U.S, Canada and Mexico, and the WTO was founded in 1995.  
All the countries of Latin America joined the WTO in 1995, except Ecuador and Panama, 
which joined in 1996 and 1997, respectively (The World Trade Organization 2006).  
Therefore, the free trade policies advocated by the IGOs have had profound influence in 
the region.  However, since these Washington Consensus policies have been advanced in 
Latin America, wealth has increasingly concentrated upward. The income disparity 
between rich and poor, already one of the highest worldwide, has grown, while the region 
ended the millenium with over $700 billion in debt (Sherman 2000). 
 Nancy Birdsall and Miguel Székely (2003) emphasize the fact that low growth 
rates in the region, coupled with high rates of inequality stemming from the era of 
colonization, have also contributed to the persistence of poverty and income disparity in 
Latin America.  However, they stress that continued poverty is part of a vicious cycle in 
which poverty and inequality in turn perpetuate low growth rates, keeping the region 
underdeveloped and exacerbating the problems of the poor.  The poor are in want of 
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access to credit due to lack of collateral (especially access to land or housing deeds).  In 
addition, they cannot afford to keep their children in school, so the family is cut off from 
future earning potential that an education would provide.  Economic reforms in the past 
two decades have thus failed to address the underlying structural problems that inhibit 
growth for the poor. 
 Labor issues are yet another source of persistent poverty in Latin America.  
According to Jaime Saavedra (2003), low quality jobs and the prevalence of the informal 
sector within Latin America are the two key problems facing workers.  The informal 
sector consists of employment without social benefits, unemployment protection or 
compliance with occupational safety regulations, and it accounts for more than 50 percent 
of jobs in urban areas, as well as the vast majority of rural jobs (214).   Trade 
liberalization and foreign direct investment that can increase labor opportunities have 
seen the biggest demand for skilled workers in the areas of service, finance and 
insurance; however, poor quality education due to decreased government funding and 
lack of tertiary education have provided mostly unskilled workers who do not meet these 
needs.  Due to globalization, demand for unskilled labor has also flourished in countries 
with lower labor costs, such as China or Southeast Asia, thus decreasing demand for 
unskilled labor in Latin America.  Additionally, privatization of state enterprises 
supported by economic globalization also demands skilled employees, rather than 
unskilled workers, to prosper in a competitive environment.  Further exacerbating these 
problems is the lack of a social safety net for those who become or remain unemployed.  
Thus poverty persists despite growth provided by globalization and trade liberalization, 
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while decreased government spending cannot mitigate the effects of unemployment and 
poverty. 
 How has the region responded to increased poverty and social upheaval?  In 
several countries in the region, there has been a decided shift against proponents of 
market reform as the only route to solving Latin America’s economic problems.  In 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia, presidents campaigning on 
progressive policies contrary to economic globalization have won elections in the past 
decade: Hugo Chávez of Venezuela in 1998, Lucio Gutiérrez of Ecuador in 2002 (forced 
from office in 2005), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil in 2003, Néstor Kirchner of 
Argentina in 2003, Tabaré Vázquez of Uruguay in 2005, and Evo Morales of Bolivia in 
2006 (although it is quite early to discern whether the viewpoints of Vázquez and 
Morales will change in office, as happened in the 1990s in Argentina (Menem)and in 
Ecuador after Gutiérrez took office).  None of these officials has bucked the prescriptions 
of the IFIs completely, as all remain members of the WTO and have continued to pay 
international loans.  But all have claimed to be working to benefit their citizens more and 
reduce poverty, rather than working strictly for elite or foreign interests.  This paper will 
now explore one of these presidents, Néstor Kirchner, and his role in Argentina’s 
response to economic globalization. 
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Chapter Five: Argentina 
Historical Background 
Argentina is a country with abundant land and natural resources that has 
historically exported commodity goods such as grains and beef.  The country was long 
one of the most prosperous in Latin America, with a large, educated middle-class and 
opportunity for upward mobility (especially through education).  However, from 1930 to 
1983, Argentina experienced great political instability due to numerous military coups 
and dictatorships, along with financial crises and high inflation.  After the return to 
democracy in 1983, crippling rates of hyperinflation (until 1990), economic problems and 
corruption were common, culminating in the economic collapse of December 
2001/January 2002.  What led to the collapse, and how have Argentina’s political and 
economic prospects changed since that time? 
 One of the most defining aspects of Argentine politics (and consequently, 
economic policy) is its history concerning former president General Juan Domingo 
Perón.  Perón was president from 1946-1955, and again from 1973 until his death in 
1974, and gave his name to arguably the strongest political movement within the country, 
Peronism (also known by its formal name, the Partido Justicialista, or the Justicialist 
Party).  Peronism, the Argentine rendition of populism, was an ideological union of 
socialism, fascism and Keynesian economics (Nef 2002).  Perón gleaned much of his 
political strength from the working class, and augmented his power by promoting trade 
unions (especially under the General Labor Confederation, or CGT) and their bargaining 
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power, along with workers’ rights and benefits.  Perón employed strong state government 
in order to ensure full employment and a healthy domestic market, and was inspired by 
Keynsian ideas popular in many parts of the world after World War II (Romero 2002).  In 
the post-World War II world in which Europe was greatly weakened, Perón and the state 
stepped in to nationalize many industries formerly owned by Europeans, including the 
railroads, utilities, telephone and gas companies.  Additionally, he began a national 
airline and nationalized the central bank. He also supported Import-Substitution 
Industrialization in order to reduce reliance on foreign imports and expand Argentina’s 
domestic market.  (Import-Substitution Industrialization, or ISI, attempted to produce 
previously imported goods domestically, aided by protective tariffs, and fell out of favor 
throughout Latin America in the early 1980s).   
At the same time that Perón increased state power via the aformentioned policies, 
he sought greater control of the state through authoritarian measures.  His administration 
controlled the judiciary and manipulated the radio and press, often disbursing Peronist 
propaganda through the media (Vacs 2006).  Additionally, Perón consolidated all power 
in the hands of the executive, not only in the position of president, but also in the role of 
governor and mayor of each province and city (ostensibly to fill each with a Peronist) 
(Romero 2002).  Perón also instituted 5-year plans in which he increased worker benefits 
(including paid vacations, pensions and health care), as well as increasing state regulation 
and protectionism of state industries.     
 While strong state government by means of the above policies is associated with 
the Peronist party, its doctrine also includes the idea of social justice.  Perón sought to 
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strengthen class identity through integration with the state, and promoted the recognition 
of working people along with social mobility (through education) and a welfare state.   
 A second historical aspect relevant to the proposed examination of Argentina 
under Néstor Kirchner is the brutal military dictatorship of 1976-1983.  The military 
government promised to establish order within yet another era of financial crisis in 
Argentina’s history, this time stemming from Isabel Perón’s presidency after the death of 
her husband in 1974; however, economic problems continued while the government 
simultaneously executed a period of terror and genocide that culminated in the loss of 
30,000 people (los desaparecidos, or “disappeared persons”) and a pervasive climate of 
fear (Vacs 2006).  During this six-year period, political party activity was prohibited, as 
were labor movement and trade union activities.  At the same time, the Peronist party was 
divided into several factions that included the Montoneros, a socialist-inclined branch of 
the party that engaged in guerrilla activities against the government, and the labor and 
rights groups that upheld Perón’s principles within Peronism.   
 According to Luis Alberto Romero (2002), the military government destroyed 
Argentina’s economy.  In what can be seen as the beginning of reforms continued under 
presidents Alfonsín (elected in 1983) and Menem (elected in 1989), the military 
government eliminated state controls and dismantled the mechanisms for protecting local 
industry in what it hoped would be a panacea for the economic problems of the previous 
decades.  Believing the failing economy stemmed from interventionist state policy and a 
semi-closed market, the military leaders and their economic advisors attempted to replace 
state intervention with the market.  At the same time, they hoped to reduce the 
contentious influence of political groups that tried to dictate public policy because 
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forthwith the market, rather than the state, would allocate resources (Vacs 2006). 
However, the rapid changes, coupled with the overvaluation of the Argentine peso, led to 
a flood of cheap imports, loss of jobs in local industry, and reduced buying power for the 
Argentine population.  High inflation persisted, at rates of up to 100 percent per year, 
while the government instituted a policy guaranteeing all bank deposits in the event of 
bankruptcy.  Thus, when several large banks collapsed, the state acquired the burden of 
the guaranteed deposits; additionally, in 1982, the state nationalized the private debt of 
many failed companies.  Due to the flailing economy, all of these changes occurred 
during an era of decreasing tax receipts, making it increasingly difficult for the 
government to fund its policies and responsibilities.  An additional strain on the system 
was the influx of petrodollars that followed high interest rates throughout Latin America, 
especially with the onset of high inflation in the U.S. in the 1970s.  Cheap credit became 
available to promote development and fend off communist influence in the region, while 
at the same time U.S. banks tried to increase their earnings via high interest rates 
(Sherman 2000).  Partially as a result of these policies, Latin America suffered the “lost 
decade” in the 1980s. Argentina thus suffered from the combination of the “lost decade” 
and its own, homegrown economic problems under the dictatorship.  The unstable 
economy, in conjunction with a war with Great Britain over the Falkland Islands in 1982, 
ultimately led to the end of the dictatorship, and the government returned to democracy 
with the 1983 election of Raul Alfonsín of the Unión Cívica Radical (the Radical Party, 
or UCR). 
 The economy continued to suffer under Alfonsín, with high inflation, increased 
foreign debt and payment demands, and insufficient resources for state employee salaries 
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and social needs such as education and health care (Vacs 2006).  The foreign debt under 
Alfonsín nearly doubled from $35 billion in 1981 to $63 billion in 1989, due at least in 
part to accumulated interest (Statistical Yearbook 1982-1990).  Alfonsín had plans for 
deeper reforms, including privatization of state industry and deregulation; however, he 
faced enormous oppostion to those ideas due to ideas rooted in society, Peronism and 
even his own party, UCR (Romero 2002).  In July 1989, inflation reached 200 percent 
and people began looting supermarkets, prompting Alfonsín to hand the presidency over 
to newly-elected Carlos Saul Menem six months early. 
Argentina under President Menem 
 The election of Carlos Menem restored the Peronist party to presidential power.  
During the election campaign, Menem promised the return of the welfare state (Romero 
2002), but once in office, he fully embraced economic liberalism.  While attempts at 
liberal reform had been tried under the military government and Alfonsín, it wasn’t until 
the population was so mired in the economic crisis of 1989, when inflation rates reached 
3,000 percent (Statistical Yearbook 1990) that it was ready to accept additional reform.  
Menem and his Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo implemented numerous policies to 
halt hyperinflation and spur the economy, one of the most important being the 
Convertibility Law.  Passed in 1991, the Covertibility Law pegged the peso to the U.S. 
dollar at a one-to-one ratio.  Additionally, under the new law, the president was 
prohibited from either modifying exchange rates or printing money above the country’s 
dollar reserves.  At the same time, the government reduced trade barriers by 33 percent to 
increase the level of cheap, imported goods. Both policies helped stabilize the economy 
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and end high inflation, which dropped to 25 percent in 1992 and 10 percent in 1993 
(Statistical Yearbook 1996).     
 In addition to the Covertibility Law, Menem also implemented two further 
policies between 1989 and 1991: the Law of Economic Emergency and the Law of State 
Reform (Romero 2002).  The former eliminated government subsidies and special 
privileges, and authorized the laying off of state employees; the latter declared the 
necessity of privatizing state-owned entities, giving the president the authority to do so as 
he deemed necessary.  In order to demonstrate his ability to obtain funds to pay down the 
foreign debt, Menem authorized the sale of ENTEL (the state telephone company) and 
Aerolineas Argentinas.  The highway system, TV networks, railroads and parts of the 
state oil industry (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales, or YPF) followed at a rapid pace, 
often benefitting those with personal ties to the president (Romero 2002).  One further 
policy instituted by Menem at this time was to raise the sales tax to provide additional 
income for the government. 
 After 1991, Cavallo continued with the privatization measures begun by Menem, 
albeit more carefully.  The government privatized the electric, gas and water utilities and, 
stemming from the culmination of its policies, saw economic gains from 1991-1994, with 
annual growth rates of 9.5 percent, 8.4 percent, 5.3 percent and 6.7 percent respectively 
(Statistical Yearbook 1996), and higher rates of foreign investment.  However, high 
unemployment accompanied privatization as many state workers were laid off in the 
name of productivity.  Additionally, the peso became overvalued due to higher inflation 
in Argentina than the U.S. (the currency to which the peso was pegged).  The overvalued 
peso kept salaries high, which not only factored into unemployment from privatization, 
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but also played a role in reducing the work force as increasingly uncompetitive local 
industries declined.  As a result of cheap imports from trade liberalization and high labor 
costs due to overvaluation of the peso, much local industry was wiped out.  
Unemployment in 1994 stood at 11.5 percent, passing the long-established ceiling of 10 
percent (Statistical Yearbook 1996). 
 In 1994, Argentina revised its constitution to allow Menem to run for an 
unprecedented second consecutive term in office, which he easily won in 1995.  
However, 1995 also saw the beginning of an economic downturn. Devaluation of the 
peso that might have made Argentine goods more competitive (and thus eased 
unemployment) was unthinkable, as the faith in the markets and trust of foreign investors 
lay in the Convertibility Law (Romero 2002).   The economy survived the downturn of 
1995 and returned to strong levels of growth, reaching 8 percent in 1997 (Statistical 
Yearbook 2000), while unemployment remained at 15 percent (Statistical Yearbook 
2004).  At this point, Cavallo instituted further privatization (until he was removed from 
office in 1996 for attempting to fight the corruption endemic to Menem’s administration).  
He was replaced by Central Bank president Roque Fernández.  
 1998 began a new, more serious economic crisis that evolved into a recession.  
GDP declined 4 percent, while interest rates on the foreign debt increased and export 
prices fell (Vacs 2006).  Protests mounted against not only expanding economic problems 
but also the corruption within the administration.  While Menem’s policies reigned in 
inflation and expanded faith in Argentina’s markets, international debt obligations 
jumped from $63 billion in 1989 to $145 billion when Menem’s presidential term ended 
in 1999 (Statistical Yearbook 1990-2000).   
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The Economic Crisis of December 2001/January 2002 and Aftermath 
 Fernando De la Rúa of the newly created Alianza para la Justicia, el Trabajo, y la 
Educación (Alliance for Justice, Work and Education) won the presidential election of 
1999 and inherited an economy in the midst of the recession that had begun in 1998.  De 
la Rúa, who returned Domingo Cavallo to the Economy Minister position once again, 
maintained the policies of economic liberalism and the Covertibility Law begun under 
Menem, and the economy worsened.  Unemployment increased from 13 percent in 1998 
to nearly 18 percent three years later (Statistical Yearbook 2004).  At the same time, 
funds for social services were limited due to high levels of debt servicing (Nef 2002).  
Throughout the country, members of the middle class resorted to bartering as an 
alternative social safety net (Krauss 2001), while at the same time payment in “scrip” 
became widespread in the provinces (Hornbeck 2002).  In July 2001, the government 
passed a law cutting government salaries and pensions by 13% in order to attempt 
compliance with debt payments.  In November 2001, the government froze all bank 
deposits in order to end a run on the banks (known as the corralito).  On December 13, 
2001, the Confederación General del Trabajo (General Confederation of Labor, or CGT) 
called a general strike against current conditions, and several days later protests spread as 
people looted supermarkets and participated in demonstrations.  Middle-class families 
protested as well, banging pots in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires to demonstrate 
their lack of food (and their anger at the inaccessible bank deposits).  The overwhelming 
anti-government sentiment current at the time was epitomized in the often-expressed, 
“¡Que se vayan todos!” (Everyone must go!) (Llanos 2004).  The government then 
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attempted to supress the protests, and 32 people were killed (Burbach 2002).  De la Rúa 
resigned on December 20.   
 Between December 20, 2001, and January 2, 2002, five different presidents 
succeeded one another.  After the third president, Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, was appointed 
by the Senate, he suspended all payments on the foreign debt (Nef 2002).  Protests 
continued and Saá was forced from office.  On January 2, the Congress chose Peronist 
Eduardo Duhalde to serve the remaining two years of De la Rúa’s term. 
 As one of his first presidential acts, Duhalde ended the practice of covertibility 
and devalued the peso.  This act made Argentine products more competitive in 
international markets, but it also wiped out the savings of middle-class families.  The 
devaluation caused the recession that had begun in 1998 to become a depression, and fear 
of hyperinflation increased.  It did not materialize, however, and the economy began to 
expand in the second half of 2002 (Llanos 2004).   
 Theories of what caused the economic collapse in Argentina abound.  Argentina 
followed all the prescriptions for growth promoted by institutions of economic liberalism, 
or the policies of the Washington Consensus.  However, while Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) expanded from 1990-1994 and again from 1996-1997, and hyperinflation ended, 
unemployment and poverty levels grew.  Additionally, due to (among other factors) 
corruption and interest, the national debt doubled from $63 billion in 1989 to $145 billion 
in 1999 (Statistical Yearbook 1990-2000) in a time of increased government income from 
privatization.  Michael Mussa (2002) of the IMF sees the economic collapse stemming 
primarily from Argentina’s inability to maintain a responsible fiscal policy (although he 
admits to two grave errors on the part of the IMF, as well), while James Petras and Henry 
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Veltmeyer (2003) view the economic collapse as a direct result of economic liberalism.  
Many Argentines (politicians and citizenry) also fault the policies of the international 
financial institutions.  However, other authors and experts fall between these two 
extremes, with many overlapping ideas stemming from the policies implemented by 
Menem and his successors.   
 The Convertibility Plan that Menem instituted in 1991 clearly had both beneficial 
and detrimental aspects. The Plan aided economic stabilization and eliminated 
hyperinflation (from over 3,000 percent in 1989 to 10 percent in 1993) (Statistical 
Yearbook 1996). After decades of instability, the population (including the middle class) 
supported the Covertibility Plan (Hershberg 2002; Mussa 2002), while at the same time, 
the Plan helped maintain investor confidence and access to funds from international 
sources.  However, it also allowed for overvaluation of the peso that led to greater 
unemployment and, after the currency was devalued, decimation of middle-class savings.  
Additionally, the price of Argentine goods was higher than what could be justified by 
productivity.  Prices rose steadily from 1991 until 1994, thus making goods more 
expensive in export markets (Llach 2004).  The high level of external debt in 1998 ($142 
billion) fueled expectations of an impending devaluation as well, causing capital flight to 
begin that same year (Llach 2004).   When De la Rúa finally took the necessary step of 
ending the plan in order to make Argentine goods more competitive, depression ensued.   
 Michael Mussa (2002) addresses two additional factors leading to the economic 
crisis: failure to maintain a responsible fiscal policy and fiscal irresponsibility in the 
provinces, which the central government funded.  Essentially, Argentina spent more than 
it collected in taxes and revenue, even as Menem privatized numerous state industries 
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(corruption thus played a role as well, as state industries were sold below market value, 
decreasing the government’s potential income).  Debt escalated from $63 billion in 1989 
to $145 billion when Menem’s presidential term ended in 1999 (Statistical Yearbook 
1990-2000).  Due to the Covertibility Plan and increased financial stability, creditors 
were very willing to fund Argentina’s burgeoning debt, which only facilitated the 
problem.  However, when Argentina experienced a period of strong economic growth 
from 1991-1994, it neglected to implement more responsible fiscal policies that might 
have reduced debt levels and diminished the likelihood of economic collapse (Mussa 
2002).  Additionally, as the recession of the late 1990s set in and the expectation of 
devaluation grew, creditors demanded higher interest rates for new loans; at the same 
time, the IMF required further austerity measures as a condition for granting loans – 
loans that were destined to ensure Argentina’s ability to cover debt payments, not help 
Argentines (Hershberg 2002).  This factor only increased the Argentine population’s 
animosity toward IFIs and the government during and after the crash. 
 Argentina’s history (as well as the history of the region) also plays an important 
role in the economic collapse.  Jorge Nef (2002) asserts that four factors (political, 
economic, social and cultural aspects), coupled with economic globalization, led to 
economic crisis.  Endemic poverty in the region was exacerbated by developmental 
failure and high debt levels stemming from the “lost decade”  and the pre-existing 
conditions of high income disparity and underdevelopment.  Stabilization policies 
instituted by Menem, while ending hyperinflation, diminished the social safety net 
available to the poor.  Additionally, as addressed above, privatization led to widespread 
unemployment.  Thus, when De la Rúa’s policies culminated in cutting government 
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salaries and pensions and instituting the corralito in order to service the foreign debt and 
avoid capital flight,  the populace saw no other choice but to protest to change the 
unbearable economic and political situation that they attributed to government policies.      
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Chapter Six: The Kirchner Years 
Background to Néstor Kirchner 
 Peronist Néstor Carlos Kirchner became president of Argentina on May 25, 2003, 
succeeding Eduardo Duhalde.   Prior to being elected president, Kirchner served as 
governor of the southern province of Santa Cruz for three consecutive terms.  Kirchner is 
married to Cristina Fernández, a senator in Buenos Aires, with whom he painstakingly 
planned his political ascension from lawyer to mayor of Río Gallegos, then to governor, 
and finally president.   Kirchner was elected on an anti-neoliberal platform and currently 
maintains a 75 percent approval rating in Argentina (“Argentina’s Néstor Kirchner” 
2006). 
 Néstor Kirchner is a strong-willed man who prefers to maintain negotiating and 
decision-making power in his own hands.  Argentines have named his approach to 
governing and negotiation the “K Style,” which has included a confrontational stance 
toward creditors (albeit mitigated by moderate action) (Gastaldi 2005), as well as 
challenging the powerful and prestigious of Argentine society, such as the military 
(Rohter 2003).  He frequently shuns protocol, exemplified by his ignoring security 
concerns to join the crowds that cheered him after his inaugeration because he was “one 
of them” (Garrone & Rocha 2003, p. 21).  As president, he remains obsessed with the 
economy, as was the case in his positions as both mayor and governor. 
In law school, Kirchner was a member of the Federación Universitaria de la 
Revolución Nacional (the University Federation of National Revolution, or FURN), part 
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of the Young Peronists movement that sought the return of Perón (this movement also 
spawned the Montoneros, a militant guerrilla group; however, Kirchner denies being part 
of the Montoneros).  Nevertheless, he was briefly jailed by the military government that 
ruled from 1976 until 1983  (Garrone & Rocha 2003). 
 After one term as mayor of Río Gallegos, Kirchner was elected governor of Santa 
Cruz in 1991.  During his three consecutive terms in this post, Kirchner bolstered the 
economy of the province (which had suffered a deficit), lowered unemployment, and 
invested in education, health care and housing for the poor.  He also focused on 
infrastructure, including roads, ports and airport construction.  With Domingo Cavallo 
(the Economy Minister under President Menem), he attempted to create a duty-free zone 
in Santa Cruz to promote industry and improve the economy; however, after problems 
developed between Kirchner and Menem, Menem annulled the project (Garrone & Rocha 
2003).  Kirchner further distanced himself from Menem when he sided with striking 
coalminers who were protesting privatization of their mine in Río Turbio, Santa Cruz, in 
1994 (Garrone & Rocha 2003).   
 The presidential election of 2003 provided a battleground between the two most 
prominent forces within Peronism: Carlos Menem and Eduardo Duhalde.  Menem wanted 
to be reelected, while Duhalde preferred that the Peronists offer the public a new 
candidate, one which he could ostensibly control while at the same time preventing 
Menem from gaining the presidency (Gaudin 2005).  In this respect, Kirchner was widely 
thought to be Duhalde’s puppet, a belief Kirchner soon corrected by instituting his own 
policies (Garrone & Rocha 2003).   This election was also the first time in its history that 
the Partido Justicialista (PJ) presented more than one candidate.  In the election of April 
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2003, Menem gained 24 percent of the vote, while Kirchner won 22 percent.  After 
numerous polls predicted that Kirchner would win the scheduled run-off election in a 
landslide victory, Menem withdrew from the race.  The withdrawal made Kirchner 
president; however, after winning with with only 22 percent of the votes, he was left 
without a strong mandate.   
In order to establish a positive image and distinguish himself before the populace, 
Kirchner confronted two influential groups during his first 100 days in office:  the 
military and the Supreme Court.  First, he propelled the retirement of 19 generals, 13 
admirals and 12 brigadier generals, essentially purging the military of high-level actors 
from the military regime of 1976-1983 (Garrone & Rocha 2003).  Additionally, in order 
to enhance the rule of law and rid the court of corrupt judges from the Menem era who 
might oppose his reforms, Kirchner urged Congress to expedite impeachment 
proceedings against the Supreme Court justices (a process they had initiated several 
weeks before).  Availing himself of research completed by six NGOs (nongovernmental 
organizations), he then established a more transparent selection process for new justices 
that included publishing their qualifications and allowing organizations to register an 
opinion prior to their selection (Farmelo & Cibils 2003).   
 In addition to the steps discussed above, Kirchner also advanced the human rights 
situation within Argentina soon after becoming president.  He met with human rights 
groups (including the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo who seek justice for the 30,000 
“disappeared” people from the era of the military dictatorship), and then reversed an 
executive order that prohibited extradition of military officers to countries whose citizens 
had disappeared under the military regime.  Finally, he exhorted Congress to repeal the 
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“impunity laws” that forbade prosecution of members of the military for crimes against 
humanity during the military dictatorship.  Congress soon complied (Farmelo & Cibils 
2003).  In June 2005, the Supreme Court declared the impunity laws unconstitutional, 
opening the way for more than 500 potential prosecutions (“Argentina’s Supreme Court” 
2005). 
President Kirchner’s Policies 
 When Kirchner took office in 2003, he faced two difficult government defaults 
from the economic crisis of 2001/2002: the IMF and private bondholders.  Kirchner, who 
had campaigned for president on an anti-neoliberal platform, promised that he would 
neither allow the IMF to dictate Argentine policy, nor further impoverish Argentines for 
the sake of paying back debt (especially to the IMF, which was widely viewed in 
Argentina as having played a role in the economic crisis) (Rohter 2006).  He thus 
assumed a confrontational, “K Style” stance with both entities, accompanied by his 
Economy Minister Roberto Lavagna.   
In September 2003, Kirchner refinanced $21.6 billion in debt with the IMF over 
three years, on terms largely seen as beneficial to Argentina (Smith 2003).   The primary 
advantage for Argentina was a commitment of only 3 percent GDP fiscal surplus to pay 
toward the debt (although this was equivalent to the total annual budget appropriations 
for health, science and technology, education, housing, water supply, energy and fuels, 
communications, environmental protection, transport, the judiciary, security and prisons) 
(“Argentina: Dissecting IMF Deal” 2003).  Nevertheless, by comparison, the Fund-set 
fiscal surpluses at the time for Brazil and Ecuador were 4.25 percent and 5 percent, 
respectively (Smith 2003).  In return, Argentina agreed to maintain inflation in the single 
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digits (a goal it has not managed to keep), enact tax and banking reform, renegotiate 
utility contracts to seek higher rates, and restructure its debt to bondholders (“Argentina: 
Dissecting IMF Deal” 2003).  In order to comply with his vow not to allow the IMF to 
dictate policy to Argentina, Kirchner made the country’s final payment of $9.8 billion to 
the IMF in January 2006; at the same time, he stated that he was liberating Argentina 
from an entity that made demands that contradict economic growth (Rohter 2006).  (The 
government was able to pay this debt due partly to the fact that Venezuela has bought 
Argentine debt and is now accepted as a “lender of last resort” for the country) (“Populist 
Economic Policies?” 2005). While Argentina maintains outstanding debt to other sources, 
paying off the IMF has been an important symbol not only of Kirchner’s power, but also 
for a country deeply suspicious of policies propagated by international financial 
institutions.   
President Kirchner’s second significant financial success was restructuring $100 
billion of defaulted bondholder debt at a 75 percent reduction of the market value.  After 
three years of negotiations and court battles, the administration made a formal offer to 
bondholders in January 2005, with which it hoped to reach an acceptance level of at least 
50 percent (“Tracking Trends” 2005, January 18).  Two months later, in March 2005, 76 
percent of creditors had accepted the proposal, allowing Argentina to issue new bonds at 
no more than 30 cents on the dollar (Rohter 2005).  While obviously an important 
financial achievement for Argentina, the president’s stance and success also created a 
potential new model for negotiations for other nations in debt, who typically pay 50-65 
percent of debt under restructuring (Rohter 2005).  Moreover, Kirchner linked the 
country’s loan payments to its economic performance; thus, Argentina will make higher 
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payments when the country is doing well, and lower payments if it declines (Sánchez 
2006).  This policy allows the government to fulfill its commitments to its citizenry 
without risking another default – a potent plan that other nations could adopt that would 
benefit both the indebted nation and its citizens, as well as its creditors who avoid 
potential loss from default.  Through his negotiations with both the IMF and the 
bondholders, Kirchner fulfilled his promise of not further impoverishing Argentines, 
while also attempting to strengthen the country’s sovereignty in the face of the fallout 
from the economic crisis four years before.   
Before investigating some of the specific policies that President Kirchner has 
implemented, it is important to examine Argentina’s current economic status.  Since the 
crisis of December 2001/January 2002, the country has experienced strong annual growth 
rates.  Growth of Gross Domestic Product before and during the crisis was negative: -0.8 
percent in 2000, -4.4 percent in 2001, and –10.8 percent in 2002 (the country experienced 
a recession beginning in 1998, which lasted until it developed into the economic crisis of 
2002) (Statistical Yearbook 2004).  Since that time, however, GDP has grown 
immensely:  8.8 percent in 2003, 9.0 percent in 2004, and 9.2 percent in 2005 (Instituto 
Naciónal de Estadística y Censos 2006), with projected growth for 2006 of 7.5 percent, 
the highest projection in the region (Sánchez 2006).  Continued high growth rates have 
allowed the country to satisfy its external debt commitments (even paying off its IMF 
debt) and expand social welfare benefits.  Nevertheless, the increased growth does not 
appear to be a result of Kirchner’s policies, but a recovery based on devaluation of the 
peso due to the end of the Convertibility Plan and a positive international climate 
(Gastaldi 2005; Petras 2004).  In recent years, the dollar has weakened in value, China 
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joined the World Trade Organization (thus increasing demand) and markets opened in 
India, while interest rates dropped worldwide (Gastaldi 2005).  Additionally, Argentina 
saw strengthened demand and higher prices for its commodity goods (meat, grains and 
soybeans), at the same time that it increased utilization of unused, existing capacity in 
manufacturing (Petras 2004).  However, growth could be unsustainable without greater 
development of a domestic market and further investment in existing industry (as well as 
access to capital, which Argentina’s debt restructuring in 2005 appears to have 
ameliorated; investment rose from $29 billion in 2004 to $41 billion in 2005) (Sánchez 
2006). 
In order to investigate Kirchner’s policies with a view to determining whether he 
is providing Argentina with a potential new model of development, two areas of 
examination are imperative: nationalization of previously privatized industries and  social 
welfare policies.  During Menem’s presidency (1989-1999), the government privatized 
ENTEL (the state telephone company), the highway system, TV networks, railroads, 
parts of the state oil industry (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales, or YPF) and the electric, 
gas and water utilities.  Since Kirchner took office three years ago, he has renationalized 
the post office, a passenger rail line and most recently, the French water company Aguas 
Argentinas in March 2006 (Sánchez 2006).  Aguas Argentinas, which was partly owned 
by Suez of France, had not fulfilled contractual obligations nor improved the quality of 
water that it provided to Buenos Aires, according to the government; however, Suez had 
also requested rate increases of 60 percent in 2005 to compensate for prices that had been 
frozen since 2002.  The water utility will now be managed by Aysa, which is 90 percent 
state-owned and 10 percent employee-owned (“Argentina Severs Suez Deal” 2006).   
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Kirchner has not nationalized the energy or telecommunications industry; 
however, in 2004 the government created Energía Argentina Sociedad del Estado 
(ENARSA), of which 65 percent is government held and 35 percent is traded on the stock 
market (“Tracking Trends” 2004, May 18).  The goal of ENARSA is to promote 
exploration and development of petroleum, gas, coal and electricty resources, and it 
works in conjunction with private enterprises including Repsol-YPF of Spain and 
Petrobras of Brazil.  ENARSA does not have the same status as state-owned oil 
companies such as Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) or Petróleos de Venezuela SA 
(PDVSA); however, in 2005, it signed an agreement with Aeropuertos Argentina 2000 to 
form a company to provide fuel to all the airports in Argentina (Cantón 2005, June 4).  In 
addition to forming ENARSA, the government has raised taxes on oil and gas exports (oil 
exporters now pay 25 percent, an increase of 5 percent, while gas exporters pay 20 
percent instead of the former 5 percent) (“Tracking Trends” 2004, May 18).  Argentina 
suffered a severe energy crisis in 2004, and energy has since become a primary 
government policy concern.  Kirchner has accused the private oil companies of not 
fulfilling contractual obligations for investment, exploration and development, thus 
causing the energy crisis and fueling the founding of ENARSA (Cantón 2005, April 26; 
“Tracking Trends” 2004, May 18). 
While trying to ameliorate energy concerns in Argentina through the above 
policies, Kirchner has also taken a confrontational stance with at least one foreign oil 
company: Shell.  In March 2005, after Shell announced a 4.2 percent price increase in the 
price of fuel, Kirchner called for a boycott of the company, entreating the population not 
to buy anything from Shell, “ni una lata de aceite” (not even a can of oil) (Cantón 2005, 
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March 11).  Fear of increasing inflation played a part in the boycott demand; however, 
negotiations between Shell and Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) that involved Shell 
selling its refineries and 900 service stations to PDVSA had also recently failed, raising 
suspicion of an ulterior motive (Cantón 2005, March 11). 
The second area through which Kirchner has tried to further Argentina’s national 
development is social welfare policy.  After the economic crisis of 2002, then President 
Eduardo Duhalde instituted the Jefes y Jefas de Hogar (“Heads of Households”) work 
plan in which more than 2 million unemployed heads of households with children 
received $50.00 (150 Argentine pesos) per month in exchange for small amounts of work 
(Petras 2004).  Kirchner continued this program, which is the government’s largest social 
welfare plan and now serves 1.5 million beneficiaries (the remainder having found work) 
(Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social 2006).  However, in February 2006, 
the government announced plans to restructure the Heads of Households work plan into 
two social programs that will target different groups: Capacity and Employment 
Insurance, whose beneficiaries will receive approximately $75.00 (225 Argentine pesos)  
per month, and Families (originally announced in 2004), whose beneficiaries will receive 
between $65.00-$75.00 (200-225 Argentine pesos) per month (Braslavsky 2006).  The 
Capacity and Employment Insurance program dictates that beneficiaries fulfill training 
requirements and utilize an Employment Office to look for work; it provides higher 
subsidies than the Heads of Households work plan, but places stricter demands on 
participants in order to encourage a “culture of work” (Braslavsky 2006).  Conversely, 
the Families program is designed specifically for families or single mothers whose 
primary responsibility is the health and education of children; it provides a higher 
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payment than the Heads of Households, as well.  In announcing the restructuring of the 
social welfare plan, Kirchner admitted to enduring income disparity in the country and 
promised further “redistributive measures” to ameliorate poverty (Braslavsky 2006). 
With respect to pensioners, Kirchner’s administration raised their monthly 
payment from $65.00 (200 Argentine pesos) to approximately $71.00 (220 Argentine 
pesos) per month in 2003.  The minimum wage was also raised at that time, from $65.00 
(200 Argentine pesos) to $81.00 (250 Argentine pesos) (“Argentina: Unemployment and 
Poverty” 2003).  Additionally, the administration instituted the Generic Prescription Law, 
which guarantees government provision of drugs at 90 percent discount in primary care 
clinics that aid low income families (approximately 15 million people).  According to the 
Ministry of Health, this law includes 82 percent of drugs prescribed in Argentina, thus 
opening drug treatment to many who previously could not afford it (Petras 2004).   
In the area of education, the President recently (May 2006) convoked a 180-day 
“debate” period within which the government will study various aspects of the National 
Education Law of 1993 and propose changes (Presidencia de la Nación Argentina 2006).  
Areas of study will include the universalization of preschool and the obligation of 
attending secondary school.  Additionally, launched in May 2005, the government is 
piloting a program in Buenos Aires for children aged 11-18 who have quit school but 
want to return.  The children who participate in Todos a Estudiar (“All Study”) receive 
scholarships (400 Argentine pesos, or $130 annually), while the schools and teachers 
each receive additional funding for every student enrolled (Presidencia de la Nación 
Argentina 2006).  The program currently includes 146 schools and over 3,600 students 
(“Todos a Estudiar” 2005), although the government ultimately plans to offer 
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scholarships to 40,000 students in 800 schools (Presidencia de la Nación Argentina 
2006).   
Finally, included as part of Kirchner’s social welfare policy is his attempt to 
mitigate slowly rising inflation rates through price controls.  As examined above, the 
policies of President Menem in the 1990s ended hyperinflation and stabilized the 
currency.  Since the end of the Convertibility Plan and the devaluation of 2002, inflation 
has remained relatively low but has begun to increase in the past two years: 26 percent in 
2002, 13 percent in 2003,  9.7 percent in 2004, 12.3 percent in 2005, and projected at 13 
percent for 2006 (Statistical Yearbook 2004; The World Factbook 2006; “Brazil and 
Southern Cone” 2006).  In the last quarter of 2005, Kirchner convinced Argentina’s large 
supermarket chains to commit to 15 percent lower prices on food, personal hygiene 
products and apparel, and then persuaded their suppliers to do the same (“Tracking 
Trends” 2005, December 6; “Tracking Trends” 2005, December 13).  The administration 
is also in the process of renegotiating contracts with 46 utility, transportation and 
telecommunications companies that were privatized under Menem, all of which had their 
rates frozen by presidential decree after the economic crisis in 2002.  The only contract 
that has been completed and approved by Congress thus far is with the regional electric 
company Edelap (Empresa Distribuidora La Plata, SA), which allows for a 15 percent 
rate increase (Rossi 2005).  Due to inflation fears and to avoid price increases before the 
midterm elections in October 2005, the administration requested an extension in the 
renegotiation process; however, renegotiation (and probable rate increases) will occur in 
2006 and be applicable for 2007 (Rossi 2005).   
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Results of Kirchner’s Policies 
   Néstor Kirchner has been president of Argentina for three years and, while he 
maintains a high popularity rating within his country, assessing the efficacy of his 
policies requires acknowledgement of the fact that three years is a relatively short period 
of time to appraise structural change.  Moreover, as stated above, many of the causes of 
Argentina’s high growth rates these past three and one-half years have been based on 
devaluation of the peso and a positive international climate.  In light of his goals of a 
more equitable society and his lefist label, a more accurate evaluation of Kirchner’s 
policies is based on changes in poverty levels, unemployment and income distribution.   
 According to Argentina’s Instituto Naciónal de Estadística y Censos (National 
Statistics and Census Institute, or INDEC), poverty rates have gradually decreased since 
the high point of 57.5 percent in 2002.  Poverty rates dropped to 47.8 percent in 2003, 
40.2 percent in 2004 and 33.8 percent in 2005 (the most recent data available).  At the 
same time, unemployment rates have also decreased steadily: 19.7 percent in 2002, 15 
percent in 2003, 14.8 percent in 2004 and 11.1 percent in 2005 (Statistical Yearbook  
2004; The World Factbook 2006).  However, it is important to note that the government 
counts as “employed” participants in the Heads of Households program; thus the decline 
in unemployment rates is not due solely to expansion of the job market.  If the Heads of 
Households recipicients were included in unemployment rates, they would increase by 
approximately three percent (“Tracking Trends” 2006, March 7).   
The second primary measure of improved living standards due to policy changes 
by the current administration is income distribution.  Rates of income distribution in 
Latin America have historically been some of world’s most unequal (Sherman 2000), 
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although Argentina was long one of the most prosperous countries in Latin America, with 
a large, educated middle-class and opportunity for upward mobility.  However, in the past 
three decades, disparity in income distribution in Argentina has increased greatly: the 
income share of the poorest decile fell from 3 percent in 1974 to 1.2 percent in 2003, 
while the income ratio between the poorest decile and the richest grew from 8 to more 
than 30 (Monitoring Socio-Economic Conditions 2005).  In examining income disparity 
under President Kirchner, the negative trend has not abated.  For the two years of his 
presidency for which there is information (2003-2004), the poorest decile maintained 1.2 
percent of the share of income, while the richest decile received 39 percent in 2003 and 
38.4 percent in 2004 (Monitoring Socio-Economic Conditions 2005).  However, a longer 
term perspective is necessary to fully judge whether Kirchner’s policies will alter this 
disparity. 
As stated above, inflation has become a primary concern for the Kirchner 
administration, prompting price controls and postponement of renegotiation of utility 
prices frozen since 2002.  However, while Argentina has experienced high growth rates 
the past three years, investment has not kept pace due to negative real interest rates 
(“Argentina: 9.1% Growth” 2006).  Price controls are being utilized to control inflation, 
rather than the standard recipe of raising interest rates.  However, without increased 
investment that would follow higher interest rates, it will be difficult for the country to 
sustain growth and build a stronger domestic market (“Argentina: 9.1% Growth” 2006).  
A well-developed domestic market would help cultivate a larger middle class (as had 
historically been a common factor in Argentina) and further decrease unemployment and 
poverty rates.  
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One further aspect of Kirchner’s policies requires examination: his consolidation 
of power.  While not a linear result of the administration’s economic and social welfare 
policies, Kirchner’s consolidation of power certainly plays a role in his ability to fulfill 
his promises.  As stated above, Kirchner became president in 2003 without a strong 
mandate, receiving only 22 percent of the national vote.  He has since built a strong 
popularity rating, currently at 75 percent of the population (“Argentina’s Néstor 
Kirchner” 2006).  When elected, Kirchner was viewed by some as a puppet of former 
president Eduardo Duhalde in his ongoing political battle with Carlos Menem; Kirchner 
soon overcame that misperception through both his confrontational political style and his 
policies.  However, Kirchner’s split from Duhalde has developed into a widening rift 
within the Peronist party.  Durning his Patagonia years in the government, Kirchner 
founded his own branch within the Peronist party: Frente para la Victoria (Front for 
Victory, or FPV) (Garrone & Rocha 2003).  Duhalde also has his own branch of support 
within the Justicialist Party: the Justicialist Front.  The rift between these two branches of 
the Peronist party (the kirchneristas and the duhaldistas) has at times blocked the passage 
of legislation within Congress (“Argentina: Kirchner-Duhalde Rift” 2005), although 
kirchnerista gains in the midterm election of October 2005 helped ease the situation 
somewhat. 
A powerful symbol of his success is the fact that Kirchner’s wife, Cristina 
Fernández, won her election for Senator of Buenos Aires province (a former Duhalde 
stronghold) in the midterm elections of October 2005, beating Duhalde’s wife.  
Kirchner’s Front for Victory Party (within the Peronist party) gained seats in both the 
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, although it does not hold an outright majority (The 
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World Factbook 2006).   (Although coupled with Duhalde’s Justicialist Front (FJ) within 
the Peronist party, the Justicialist Party maintains a majority).   
While Kirchner’s success in the midterm election increases the likelihood of 
implementing more of his policies before the next presidential election in 2007, there is 
also a risk inherent in investing too much power in one person.  As stated above, 
Kirchner is strong-willed and maintains a confrontational political style – a fact that 
increased his popularity in Argentina during his negotiations with the IMF and the 
bondholders.  However, too much power granted to one person creates the potential for 
corruption, in addition to the fact that it will be nearly impossible for Kirchner’s 
successor to replicate his personalistic style and policies.  Moreover, Kirchner has taken 
to ruling by decree when necessary, having availed himself of his Congress-given right to 
do so in cases of urgency and necessity.  In the first two years of his presidency, Kirchner 
submitted 140 bills to the legislature for approval; during the same time frame, he issued 
166 decrees covered by the “economic emergency” he inherited when he became 
president (“Kirchner Basks in Strong Approval” 2005).  However, the country has 
experienced three successive years of strong economic growth and is poised for a fourth, 
leading many opponents to claim that the economic emergency has ended and Kirchner’s 
use of decree should be revoked. 
Based on the above information on poverty, unemployment and income 
distribution, it would seem that the results of Kirchner’s policies thus far are mixed.  
Growth continues to be steady (although it is aided by the international climate and the 
high price of commodity goods), poverty levels have decreased and unemployment is 
lower (even when the recipients of the Heads of Households subsidy are excluded from 
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the count).  Kirchner has increased payments to pensioners, increased the minimum wage 
and divided the social welfare program (Heads of Households) to better serve two distinct 
communities: those seeking work (the Capacity and Employment Insurance program) and 
families headed predominantly by single mothers (Families).  Moreover, his 
administration has instituted the Generic Prescription Law to provide medicine to the 
poor, and recently called for a renewed examination into education policy and programs.  
Opposed to these gains, however, is the fact that income distribution has not 
begun to decrease and inflation continues to rise, eroding gains from the above social 
welfare programs.  Price controls provide a temporary measure to stem inflation, but they 
also have the potential to stymie investment in certain sectors of the economy which, 
coupled with negative real interest rates, will further hamper the expansion of a domestic 
market.  Without a strong domestic market and further development of industry, a drop in 
commodity prices or a shift in the international climate could cause growth levels to 
diminish, leading to higher unemployment and a return to higher levels of poverty.   
It is important to reiterate that Kirchner has been in office for only three years, a 
limited amount of time to judge the long-term success or failure of his new policies.  He 
recently replaced his Economy Minister Roberto Lavagna with Felisa Miceli (December 
2005), which could signal a shift in policies.  Additionally, he is widely expected to run 
for president in the 2007 election, which may cause him to alter his policies and, if he 
wins, provide him with the opportunity to become more leftist or more centrist in his 
second term.   
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
The research question proposed in the introduction was to determine if the 
policies pursued by the recently elected (in the last decade) leftward-leaning presidents in 
Latin America suggest a potential development alternative to the policies of economic 
globalization, as seen through a case study of Argentina.  The hypothesis was that the 
new president of Argentina, Néstor Kirchner, while not completely rejecting trade 
liberalization or globalization, is pursuing policies of stronger state intervention and 
government control in order to direct the economy and provide greater stability within 
Argentina following the economic collapse of December 2001/January 2002.  Stability in 
this context signifies sustained economic growth, declining or low poverty rates (below 
20%; poverty in Argentina in 1994 stood at 16%), low or stable rates of unemployment 
(historically at less than 10% in Argentina, until the 1990s), and a low rate of inflation 
(10% per year).  (Inflation in Argentina has historically been high, but President 
Kirchner’s stated target is 10%) (Miguez 2005). The methodology proposed for the study 
was a longitudinal approach to investigate the policies of both President Carlos Menem 
(1989-1999) and President Néstor Kirchner (2003-present), using aggregate statistics of 
such indicators as growth, poverty rates, unemployment and inflation to assess the results 
of each president’s policies.  In addition, it will be necessary to evaluate Kirchner’s 
policies against the criteria for development alternatives presented in the Literature 
Review, specifically the works of Joseph E. Stiglitz, Charles Gore and W.D. Lakshman.   
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The first factor to address is whether Kirchner is providing greater stability in 
Argentina following the economic collapse of December 2001/January 2002.  Utilizing 
the four benchmark standards for stability discussed above (economic growth, low or 
declining poverty rates, low or stable unemployment and low inflation), Kirchner’s 
policies (coupled with devaluation of the peso and the international financial climate) 
have created greater stability in Argentina.  While growth was negative from 1999 to 
2002, GDP has grown immensely since that time: 8.8 percent in 2003, 9.0 percent in 
2004, and 9.2 percent in 2005 (Instituto Naciónal de Estadística y Censos 2006), with 
projected growth for 2006 of 7.5 percent (Sanchez 2006).  While poverty has not declined 
to the benchmark statistic of 20 percent, is has progressively dropped from 57.5 percent 
in 2002 to 33.8 percent in 2005 – a three-year decrease that affects nearly 25 percent of 
the population (Instituto Naciónal de Estadística y Censos 2006).  It is possible to surmise 
that if growth rates remain positive and Kirchner’s social welfare policies are maintained, 
poverty will continue to diminish.  With the higher growth rate, unemployment has also 
declined from 19.7 percent in 2002 to 11.1 percent in 2005 (Statistical Yearbook 2004; 
The World Factbook 2006) (including beneficiaries of the Heads of Households work 
program).    
While the above three indicators of stability are positive, the fourth indicator, rate 
of inflation, has begun to increase (9.7 percent in 2004, 12.3 percent in 2005, and 
projected at 13 percent for 2006) (The World Factbook 2006; “Brazil and the Southern 
Cone” 2006).  Kirchner has instituted price controls and postponed renegotiation of 
utility contracts in order to halt the increase, but these are temporary policies.  The 
government will need to reassess monetary policy to overcome negative real interest 
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rates; higher interest rates could decrease inflation and increase investment, potentially 
cultivating a stronger domestic market and the return of the middle class. 
To judge Kirchner’s policies as an alternative model of development for 
Argentina, it is first essential to compare them to those of President Menem, who 
embraced neoliberal economic policy after becoming president in 1989.  Menem 
instituted Washington Consensus policies, including privatizing state entities, reducing 
tariffs, increasing taxes, eliminating subsidies and instituting a form of fiscal reform in 
order to reign in hyperinflation (the Convertibility Plan, which was not specifically an 
IMF dictate) (Mussa 2002).  (It is important to note that fiscal reform did not preclude the 
provinces from excess spending, and that Menem’s administration was widely known to 
be corrupt; thus, money from privatization did not necessarily benefit the state).  Under 
Menem, inflation decreased from 3,000 percent in 1989 to 10 percent in 1993 (Statistical 
Yearbook 1996), and then to 0.7 percent in 1998 (Statistical Yearbook 2004).  Growth 
rates over the decade were mixed, as 1991-1994 (9.5 percent, 8.4 percent, 5.3 percent, 6.7 
percent) and 1996-1998 (5.5 percent, 8.0 percent, 3.8 percent) were positive; 1989, 1990 
and 1995 (-6.5 percent, -0.1 percent, -4.6 percent) were negative (Statistical Yearbook 
1990-2000).  Additionally, 1998 began a recession that developed into a depression with 
the economic crisis of December 2001/January 2002.  However, while the decade saw 
mostly positive growth rates, unemployment and poverty increased.   
When the decade began, unemployment stood at 7.4 percent (1990).  In 1994, 
unemployment reached 11.5 percent, passing the long-established ceiling of 10 percent.  
As Menem left office in 1999, the rate had reached 14.3 percent (Statistical Yearbook 
1991-2000).  Under Menem, Congress passed the Law of Economic Emergency (1989) 
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and the Law of State Reform (1991) (Romero 2002).  The former eliminated government 
subsidies and special privileges, and authorized the laying off of state employees; the 
latter declared the necessity of privatizing state-owned entities, giving the president the 
authority to do so as he deemed necessary.  Menem thus authorized the sale of ENTEL 
(the state telephone company) and Aerolineas Argentinas.  The highway system, TV 
networks, railroads and parts of the state oil industry (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales, 
or YPF) followed, as did the electric, gas and water utilities after 1991.  As each entity 
was sold, the newly privatized company laid off former state employees, increasing 
unemployment.  Additionally, lower tariffs and fewer protections for local industry also 
led to higher unemployment as local businesses folded or downsized due to competition 
from cheaper imports. 
Higher unemployment, coupled with reduced subsidies affecting social welfare 
programs under the 1989 Law of Economic Emergency, also increased poverty.  Poverty 
rates, which stood at 33.7 percent in 1990, initially decreased under the economic growth 
of 1991-1994 (and the end of hyperinflation).  In 1993, poverty affected 16.8 percent of 
the population, but by 1999 it had jumped back up to 27 percent (Instituto Naciónal de 
Estadística y Censos 2006).  While obviously lower than the 33.7 percent registered at the 
beginning of the decade, it is important to remember that during the same period that 
poverty increased (1994-1998), economic growth was positive for all but one of the years 
(1995).  One of the principle presumptions of economic liberalism is that high economic 
growth will decrease poverty; however, this was not the case in Argentina under Menem.  
At the same time that levels of poverty grew, income disparity increased.  From 1992 
until 1998, the share of income held by the poorest ten percent of the population declined 
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from 1.9 percent to 1.3 percent.  During the same period, the richest decile increased its 
share of income from 33.8 percent to 37.2 percent (Monitoring Socio-Economic 
Conditions 2005).  Based on levels of unemployment, poverty and income distribution, 
Menem’s policies clearly did not help all sectors of society achieve a better standard of 
living.  And while Menem’s Convertibility Plan is credited with ending hyperinflation (a 
benefit to all segments of society), the inflexibility of the Plan has also been discussed as 
one of the primary causes of the economic crisis of 2001/2002, which ultimately 
increased poverty and unemployment and decimated the middle class. 
When Néstor Kirchner became president in May 2003, he inherited a weak 
economy, albeit one that had begun to recover under the guidance of interim President 
Duhalde’s Economy Minister, Roberto Lavagna.  As discussed above, economic growth 
rebounded in 2003 (8.8 percent) and has remained strong to date (Instituto Naciónal de 
Estadística y Censos 2006), aided by devaluation of the peso and a positive international 
climate.  Poverty and unemployment have decreased; poverty stands at 33.8 percent 
(2005), down from its high point of 57.5 in 2002, while unemployment in 2005 was 11.1 
percent (including recipients of the Heads of Households work program) (Instituto 
Naciónal de Estadística y Censos 2006; The World Factbook 2006).  Admittedly, the 
current poverty rate is higher than the 27 percent rate in 1999; however, the trend under 
Menem was increasing poverty during years of positive growth rates, while the trend 
during Kirchner’s three years has been decreasing poverty during years of positive 
growth rates.  Comparing unemployment rates between the two administrations is more 
difficult as the rate under Menem did not include members of the Heads of Households 
work program, which was begun in 2002.  However, allowing for the approximately 3 
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percent of Heads of Households recipients currently excluded from unemployment rates, 
unemployment at the end of Menem’s second term (14.3 percent) would be 
approximately the same as the current rate (11.1 percent plus 3 percent from Heads of 
Households, or 14.1 percent).  Again, it is important to examine the trend under the two 
presidents: unemployment increased during positive growth during Menem’s 
administration, while it has decreased during three years of positive growth under 
Kirchner.  (Income disparity has remained essentially the same, following the 30-year 
trend in the region) (Monitoring Socio-Economic Conditions 2005). 
Coupled with the above comparison between poverty and unemployment during 
years of positive economic growth during both administrations, discussion of actual 
policies is necessary.  Menem instituted policies of economic globalization that included 
privatizing state entities, reducing tariffs, increasing taxes and eliminating subsidies. 
Kirchner has not widely rejected policies of economic globalization; he has not 
renationalized privatized industries (although three have been nationalized: the post 
office, a railroad line and Aguas Argentinas, and his administration created a weak state-
run oil company, ENARSA, that works in conjunction with private oil companies).  In his 
goals for 2006, Kirchner discussed reforming the tax structure to make it more 
progressive; however, this has been postponed in order to concentrate on inflation 
(Miguez 2005).  Regarding trade liberalization, Argentina remains a member of the 
World Trade Organization as well as a key partner in Mercosur (Mercado Común del 
Sur), which facilites regional trade between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and 
associate Andean members.  At the end of 2004, though, Kirchner postponed auto trade 
liberalization with Brazil that was to begin in 2006, stating that it needed to be further 
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strengthened beforehand (“Tracking Trends” 2004, September 14).  One year later, the 
auto industry had grown in the first seven months of the year by 27.5 percent over the 
same period in 2004 (“Tracking Trends” 2005, August 09), and further increases were 
expected for 2006 (“Tracking Trends” 2006, January 10).  Thus, while not renouncing the 
benefits of freer trade, Kirchner also values strengthening local industry to make it more 
competitive before reducing tariffs.   
Regarding social welfare policy, Kirchner’s administration has increased the 
minimum wage and pension benefits, and recently (February 2006) announced the 
restucturing of the Heads of Households work program, which will also provide higher 
beneficiary payments.  The administration also instituted the Generic Prescription Law, 
which gives approximately 15 million poor people access to prescription drugs 
subsidized by the government (Petras 2004).  Government spending in the first 10 months 
of 2005 was 43 percent higher than the same period in 2003 (“Argentina” 2006), which, 
while it may increase inflation, has helped raise the standard of living of poor Argentines. 
Based on the above policies, as well as Kirchner’s IMF and bondholder debt 
negotiations and early termination of the IMF loan, it is obvious that Kirchner has 
implemented stronger state intervention and control in the first three years of his 
presidency.  He has not rejected tenets of economic globalization but has attempted to 
mitigate their negative effects via increased control and greater state spending on social 
welfare programs.  These policies appear to have benefitted Argentina as poverty and 
unemployment have decreased; do these policies also provide an alternative model of 
development for Argentina? 
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Three authors in the Literature Review discussed alternative development 
strategies to economic globalization: Joseph E. Stiglitz, Charles Gore and W.D. 
Lakshman.  Based on their writing, following are the nine primary components of a new 
development model (considered alternatives within globalization, as opposed to a 
complete break from globalization): (1) Greater state control in opening up to 
international markets is important, especially with regard to timing, speed and sequence.  
Use of tariffs enables national enterprises to build production capabilities, while capital 
account liberalization should be gradual. (2) Acknowledge that the state has a significant 
role in development policy and that state-owned enterprises can pioneer industries in 
promising fields and then hand them over to private enterprise.  Infrastructure remains the 
responsibility of the state, but it can benefit from private sector participation.  A key 
concept is that the State has a wider role than that advocated by economic liberalism, but 
it also supports private enterprise. (3) Macroeconomic policy is growth-oriented that 
reduces inflation and deficits but also ensures full production capacity.  Aspects of this 
policy include human resource development, technology policy, infrastructure 
development and industrial organization.  (4) Wide asset ownership and productive 
employment assist a production-oriented approach to growth, rather than redistributive 
transfers.  (5) Regional integration and cooperation are important for integration into the 
global economy, particularly in order to develop regional production chains and markets.  
(6) It is important to accept the necessity of producing basic food items and 
manufacturing (rather than strict focus on exports) to alleviate poverty and provide jobs.  
(7) Rather than focusing strictly on profits, it is necessary to recognize the benefits of 
wages that enable workers to achieve and maintain a comfortable standard of living, 
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which subsequently increases aggregate demand, reduces societal inequality, and 
improves work incentives.  (8) SAPs from “above” (the IMF, World Bank, etc.) need to 
be replaced by adjustment programs from “below” (with participation of the populace) 
because they can facilitate investment in education, research, health and productivity for 
sustained development purposes.  (9) Tailor development policy to the conditions and 
culture of each particular nation, rather than providing one policy approach for all 
developing nations. 
Before assessing Kirchner’s policies on the above criteria for an alternative model 
of development, it is imperative to reemphasize that this model provides an alternative 
within globalization rather than a radical shift or renunciation of globalization advocated 
by socialist thinkers.  As stated above, Kirchner has not rejected globalization nor many 
of its key elements:  Argentina remains part of international and regional trade 
organizations, has not nationalized key sectors of the economy, welcomes foreign 
investment, and continues to pay its foreign debt.  While Argentina may have shifted to 
the left, it has not become a socialist country. 
The first two criteria in the new development model concern greater state control 
both in development policy and with regard to timing, speed and sequence in opening up 
to international markets.  The most prominent examples in support of this component are 
Kirchner’s postponement of auto trade liberalization with Brazil (discussed above), and 
the fact that, after taking office, one of Kirchner’s first policy changes was the restriction 
of short-term speculative capital inflows (“Argentina: Lavagna” 2003).  Foreign funds 
(not linked to trade) must remain in the country for 180 days in an attempt to maintain 
currency stability.  Thus the government is attempting to control the timing and speed at 
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which it opens to international markets (in this case, financial speculation).  The third 
factor pertains to macroeconomic policy to control inflation and increase production 
capacity; to date, Kirchner’s policies have permitted an increase in inflation (which he is 
trying to control with price controls).  Therefore his policies do not currently fulfill this 
test, although production capacity (the other factor in this component) has greatly 
increased since Kirchner took office. 
The fourth criterion refers to wide asset ownership and a production-oriented 
approach to growth.  Asset ownership is dispersed in Argentina due to privatization under 
Menem (and the fact that Kirchner has not renationalized key economic sectors); 
however, many of the privatized industries are foreign owned (especially by European 
companies).  Moreover, according to a World Bank study (2005) on income distribution 
in Latin America over the past 30 years, wealth has concentrated upward.  Assets are 
owned by the elite of Argentina, a trend that grew worse as endemic corruption under 
Menem allowed those with government connections to benefit from privatization in the 
1990s (Romero 2002).  With regard to a production-oriented approach to growth, 
Argentina primarily exports commodity goods (meat, soybeans, grains, oil, natural gas) 
in addition to automobiles (The World Factbook 2006).  Its non-commodity goods 
production is therefore limited predominantly to agricultural production and automobiles 
(while a growing service industry makes up 53.7 percent of GDP) (The World Factbook 
2006). 
The fifth component, regional integration and cooperation, is a considerable factor 
in Argentina’s trade relations due to its participation in Mercosur (as discussed above).  
The sixth and seventh components concern provision of  basic food items, jobs and 
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wages to achieve and maintain a comfortable standard of living.  The strongest evidence 
of this aspect of development is Kirchner’s policies that have increased minimum wage, 
pension and social welfare payments (discussed above), as well as the educational 
program All Study (scholarships for 11-18 year olds) and the current examination of 
education policy.  Furthermore, declining unemployment rates in the past three years 
have also improved the standard of living.   
Finally, the last two criteria of the development alternative pertain to 
conditionality and development policy stemming from “below” (rather than from the 
IMF, the World Bank, etc.) and development conditions specific to one country.  In this 
regard, Kirchner’s fulfillment of the IMF loan and subsequent ability to reject its 
economic dictates provide the most powerful evidence of his desire to develop Argentina 
on the country’s own terms.   
Given the analysis above, it is clear that many of Kirchner’s policies do provide a 
new development model for Argentina.  While his policies do not fulfill all of the listed 
criteria (namely, inflation is on the rise, asset ownership is highly elite, and the economy 
is led primarily by commodity goods), Kirchner has broken from some of the key 
elements of economic liberalism: state and social welfare spending have increased and he 
has expanded state intervention and control.   
President Kirchner’s continued popularity and success also provide a powerful 
example of the shift against economic globalization within Latin America. As stated in 
the introduction, none of the new leaders of the growing anti-economic globalization 
movement in Latin America has advocated a complete break from trade liberalization or 
cooperation with multinational corporations.  However, the trend toward greater state 
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intervention, regional integration and social reform is growing.  While it is imperative to 
remember that each country in the region has its own priorities, problems and approaches 
to economic growth and poverty reduction, Kirchner’s policies that promote production, 
trade, regional integration and social well-being provide a potential development model 
for other states, as well. Investment in education, health and well being, in addition to 
policies that increase growth, ultimately lead to a more flexible and productive workforce 
that can sustain a domestic market.  Moreover, maintaining a well-educated, healthy and 
productive society will reduce the likelihood of transnational problems such as the drug 
trade, illegal immigration, human trafficking and failed states.  Finally, it is hoped that 
promoting economic development and greater opportunity for all citizens will have 
positive consequences for the Argentine people. 
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